

REDACTED

Rocky Mountain Power

Docket No. 17-035-39

Witness: Rick T. Link

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ROCKY MOUNTAIN POWER

REDACTED

Direct Testimony of Rick T. Link

June 2017

1 **Q. Please state your name, business address, and position with PacifiCorp.**

2 A. My name is Rick T. Link. My business address is 825 NE Multnomah Street, Suite 600,
3 Portland, Oregon 97232. My position is Vice President, Resource and Commercial
4 Strategy. I am testifying in this proceeding on behalf of Rocky Mountain Power, a
5 division of PacifiCorp.

6 **Q. Please describe your current responsibilities.**

7 A. I am responsible for PacifiCorp's integrated resource plan ("IRP"), structured
8 commercial business and valuation activities, long-term commodity price forecasts,
9 long-term load forecasts, and environmental strategy and policy activities. Most
10 relevant to this docket, I am responsible for the economic analysis used to screen
11 system resource investments and for implementing competitive request for proposal
12 ("RFP") processes consistent with applicable state procurement rules and guidelines.

13 **Q. Please describe your professional experience and education.**

14 A. I joined PacifiCorp in December 2003 and assumed the responsibilities of my current
15 position in September 2016. From 2003 through 2016, I have held several analytical
16 and leadership positions responsible for developing long-term commodity price
17 forecasts, pricing structured commercial contract opportunities, and developing
18 financial models to evaluate resource investment opportunities, negotiating
19 commercial contract terms, and overseeing development of PacifiCorp's resource
20 plans. I was responsible for delivering PacifiCorp's 2013, 2015, and 2017 IRPs, have
21 been directly involved with implementing several resource RFP processes, and
22 performed economic analysis supporting a range of resource investment opportunities.
23 Before joining PacifiCorp, I was an energy and environmental economics consultant

24 with ICF Consulting (now ICF International) from 1999 to 2003, where I performed
25 electric-sector financial modeling of environmental policies and resource investment
26 opportunities for utility clients. I received a Bachelor of Science degree in
27 Environmental Science from the Ohio State University in 1996 and a Masters of
28 Environmental Management from Duke University in 1999.

29 **Q. Have you testified in previous regulatory proceedings?**

30 A. Yes. I have testified in proceedings before the Wyoming Public Service Commission,
31 the Utah Public Service Commission, the Public Utility Commission of Oregon, and
32 the Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission.

33 **PURPOSE AND SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY**

34 **Q. What is the purpose of your testimony?**

35 A. I present and explain the economic analysis that shows PacifiCorp's decision to
36 upgrade, or "repower," certain wind resources is prudent and provides significant
37 customer benefits. I also summarize PacifiCorp's assessment of the wind repowering
38 project in its 2017 IRP.

39 **Q. Please summarize your testimony.**

40 A. PacifiCorp's economic analysis supports repowering approximately 999 megawatts
41 ("MW") of existing wind resource capacity located in Wyoming, Oregon, and
42 Washington. The repowered wind facilities will qualify for an additional ten years of
43 federal production tax credits ("PTCs"), produce more energy, reset the thirty-year
44 depreciable life of the assets, and reduce run-rate operating costs. PacifiCorp's
45 economic analysis of the wind repowering opportunity demonstrates that net benefits,
46 which include federal PTC benefits, net power cost ("NPC") benefits, other system

47 variable-cost benefits, and system fixed-cost benefits, more than outweigh net project
48 costs.

49 The change in revenue requirement due to wind repowering was analyzed
50 across nine different scenarios, each with varying natural gas and carbon dioxide
51 (“CO₂”) price assumptions. All nine scenarios show customer benefits, as measured by
52 the change in present-value revenue requirement over the remaining life of the
53 repowered wind facilities. With medium natural gas and medium CO₂ price
54 assumptions, the present-value change in revenue requirement due to wind repowering
55 shows \$359 million customer benefit. Across all nine scenarios, the change in present-
56 value revenue requirement due to repowering ranges from \$41 million in customer
57 benefits when assuming low natural gas prices and zero CO₂ prices to \$589 million
58 when assuming high natural gas prices and high CO₂ prices. These benefits
59 conservatively do not assign any value to the incremental renewable-energy credits
60 (“RECs”) that will be produced by the repowered wind facilities. Over the remaining
61 life of the repowered wind facilities, present-value benefits would improve for all
62 scenarios by an additional \$11 million for every dollar assigned to the incremental
63 RECs that will be generated after repowering.

64 When the present-value revenue requirement is measured over a 20-year period
65 through 2036, PacifiCorp’s economic analysis demonstrates net customer benefits in
66 seven of nine natural gas and CO₂ price scenarios (all scenarios except the two using
67 the lowest natural-gas price assumptions).

68 The wind repowering project will reduce revenue requirement soon after the
69 new equipment is placed in service in the 2019-to-2020 time frame. From 2021 through

70 2028, revenue requirement is reduced as PTC benefits increase with inflation and the
71 new equipment continues to depreciate. In his testimony, Mr. Jeffrey K. Larsen explains
72 Rocky Mountain Power’s proposal to reflect the benefits of wind repowering in rates.

73 Sensitivity analysis shows that benefits of wind repowering substantially
74 increase when combined with new Wyoming wind resources and the Aeolus-to-
75 Bridger/Anticline transmission project, which are the subject of a concurrent
76 application. Sensitivity analysis also shows that there is additional upside to customer
77 benefits if the new equipment is depreciated over a longer life and if current large-
78 generator interconnection agreements (“LGIAs”) are modified to enable repowered
79 wind facilities to operate at their full capacity.

80 **2017 INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLAN**

81 **Q. Did PacifiCorp analyze wind repowering in its 2017 IRP?**

82 A. Yes. The preferred portfolio in the 2017 IRP, representing PacifiCorp’s least-cost, least-
83 risk plan to reliably meet customer demand over a 20-year planning period, includes
84 repowering of 905 MW of existing wind resource capacity located in Wyoming,
85 Washington, and Oregon. As discussed later in my testimony, PacifiCorp expanded the
86 wind repowering scope to include its Goodnoe Hills wind facility. With the addition of
87 Goodnoe Hills, this application covers PacifiCorp’s proposal to repower approximately
88 999 MW of existing wind capacity.

89 **Q. What led PacifiCorp to evaluate the wind repowering opportunity in its 2017 IRP?**

90 A. As explained by Mr. Timothy J. Hemstreet, PacifiCorp purchased safe-harbor
91 equipment from General Electric International, Inc., and Vestas American Wind
92 Technology, Inc., in December 2016. Consistent with Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”)

93 guidance, these equipment purchases, totaling \$77.8 million, secured an option for
94 PacifiCorp to repower its fleet of owned wind resources, thereby qualifying them for
95 the full value of federal PTCs.

96 Wind repowering presents an opportunity to deliver several different types of
97 benefits for customers. First, federal PTCs will apply to 10 additional years of
98 generation from each repowered wind resource. The current value of federal PTCs,
99 which is adjusted annually for inflation by the IRS, is \$24 per megawatt-hour
100 (“MWh”). At a federal and state effective tax rate of 37.95 percent, the current PTC
101 equates to a \$38.68 per MWh reduction in revenue requirement that can be passed
102 through to customers.

103 Second, existing wind resources will be upgraded with modern technology,
104 which improves efficiency and increases energy output. The additional energy output
105 from these zero-fuel-cost assets provides incremental NPC benefits for customers.

106 Third, repowering a wind resource, which replaces the mechanical equipment
107 of an existing wind facility, resets the usable life of the asset (currently 30 years),
108 thereby extending and increasing NPC benefits over the period in which the repowered
109 wind resource would have otherwise been retired from service.

110 Finally, the turbine-supply contracts for repowering will include a two-year
111 warranty on the new equipment, which will avoid capital expenditures that would
112 otherwise be needed to replace or refurbish existing equipment. Moreover, PacifiCorp
113 anticipates that new, modern equipment will have reduced failure rates. Further, before
114 installing the new equipment, PacifiCorp can avoid capital replacement costs for
115 component failures on the existing equipment. This cost savings will be partially offset

116 by lost energy output for specific wind turbines from the time that component failures
117 occur through the time that the new equipment is installed.

118 After executing its safe-harbor equipment purchase in December 2016,
119 PacifiCorp developed a wind repowering sensitivity in the first quarter of 2017, for
120 consideration in its 2017 IRP, to evaluate the net customer benefits of the wind
121 repowering opportunity.

122 **Q. What wind resources did PacifiCorp include in the wind repowering sensitivity**
123 **presented in its 2017 IRP?**

124 A. PacifiCorp assumed repowering 905 MW of existing wind resource capacity in the
125 2017 IRP. Of the 905 MW, approximately 594 MW of this capacity are located in
126 Wyoming (Glenrock, Rolling Hills, Seven Mile Hill, High Plans, McFadden Ridge,
127 and Dunlap), approximately 101 MW are located in Oregon (Leaning Juniper), and
128 approximately 210 MW are located in Washington (Marengo). PacifiCorp has since
129 expanded its economic analysis to include Goodnoe Hills, which is located in
130 Washington.

131 **Q. What were the results of the wind repowering sensitivity presented in PacifiCorp's**
132 **2017 IRP?**

133 A. The 2017 IRP wind repowering sensitivity showed significant net customer benefits
134 across a range of assumptions related to forward market prices and federal CO₂ policy
135 based on the Clean Power Plan ("CPP").

136 **Q. Did the wind repowering sensitivity influence selection of the preferred portfolio**
137 **in the 2017 IRP?**

138 A. Yes. The wind repowering sensitivity included in the 2017 IRP showed significant net

139 customer benefits by lowering the projected system present-value revenue requirement
140 (“PVRR”) relative to other resource portfolio options. Consequently, wind repowering
141 was included in the 2017 IRP preferred portfolio, which represents PacifiCorp’s plan
142 to deliver reliable and reasonably priced service with manageable risk for customers
143 through specific action items.

144 **Q. Did PacifiCorp include a wind repowering action item in its 2017 IRP action plan?**

145 A. Yes. The 2017 IRP action plan, which lists the specific steps PacifiCorp will take over
146 the next two to four years to deliver resources in the preferred portfolio, includes the
147 following action item:

148 PacifiCorp will implement the wind repowering project, taking
149 advantage of safe-harbor wind-turbine-generator equipment
150 purchase agreements executed in December 2016.

- 151 • Continue to refine and update economic analysis of plant-
152 specific wind repowering opportunities that maximize
153 customer benefits before issuing the notice to proceed.
- 154 • By September 2017, complete technical and economic
155 analysis of other potential repowering opportunities at
156 PacifiCorp wind plants not studied in the 2017 IRP (i.e.,
157 Foote Creek I and Goodnoe Hills).
- 158 • Pursue regulatory review and approval as necessary.
- 159 • By May 2018, issue the engineering, procurement and
160 construction (EPC) notice to proceed to begin implementing
161 wind repowering for specific projects consistent with updated
162 financial analysis.
- 163 • By December 31, 2020, complete installation of wind
164 repowering equipment on all identified projects.¹

165 **Q. Please summarize PacifiCorp’s progress with this action item.**

166 A. PacifiCorp refined and updated its economic analysis of plant-specific wind
167 repowering opportunities, and is now including Goodnoe Hills in the wind repowering
168 project. The rest of my testimony presents and explains this economic analysis.

¹ PacifiCorp 2017 Integrated Resource Plan, Volume I at 16 (Apr. 4, 2017).

169 Mr. Hemstreet explains that PacifiCorp continues to evaluate repowering of the Foote
170 Creek facility in Wyoming, but due to differences in project scope for this older-vintage
171 facility, Foote Creek is not proposed as part of the wind repowering project in this
172 application. Mr. Hemstreet also discusses the need to execute contracts by early April
173 2018 and addresses the construction schedule.

174 **SYSTEM MODELING METHODOLOGY**

175 **Q. Please summarize the methodology PacifiCorp used in its system analysis of the**
176 **wind repowering project.**

177 A. PacifiCorp relied upon the same modeling tools used to develop and analyze resource
178 portfolios in its 2017 IRP to refine and update its analysis of the wind repowering
179 project. These modeling tools calculate system PVRR by identifying least-cost resource
180 portfolios and dispatching system resources over a 20-year forecast period (2017–
181 2036). Net customer benefits are calculated as the present-value revenue requirement
182 differential (“PVRR(d)”) between two simulations of PacifiCorp’s system. One
183 simulation includes the wind repowering project and the other simulation excludes the
184 wind repowering project. Customers are expected to realize benefits when the system
185 PVRR with wind repowering is lower than the system PVRR without repowering.
186 Conversely, customers would experience increased costs if the system PVRR with wind
187 repowering were higher than the system PVRR without wind repowering.

188 **Q. What modeling tools did PacifiCorp use to perform its system analysis of the wind**
189 **repowering project?**

190 A. PacifiCorp used the System Optimizer (“SO”) model and the Planning and Risk model
191 (“PaR”) to develop resource portfolios and to forecast dispatch of system resources in

192 simulations with and without wind repowering.

193 **Q. Please describe the SO model and PaR.**

194 A. The SO model is used to develop resource portfolios with sufficient capacity to achieve
195 a target planning-reserve margin. The SO model selects a portfolio of resources from a
196 broad range of resource alternatives by minimizing the system PVRR. In selecting the
197 least-cost resource portfolio for a given set of input assumptions, the SO model
198 performs time-of-day, least-cost dispatch for existing resources and prospective
199 resource alternatives, while considering the cost-and-performance characteristics of
200 existing contracts and prospective demand-side-management (“DSM”) resources—all
201 within or connected to PacifiCorp’s system. The system PVRR from the SO model
202 reflects the cost of existing contracts, wholesale-market purchases and sales, the cost
203 of new and existing generating resources (fuel, fixed and variable operations and
204 maintenance, and emissions, as applicable), the cost of new DSM resources, and
205 levelized revenue requirement of capital additions for existing coal resources and
206 potential new generating resources.

207 PaR is used to develop a chronological unit commitment and dispatch forecast
208 of the resource portfolio generated by the SO model, accounting for operating reserves,
209 volatility and uncertainty in key system variables. PaR captures volatility and
210 uncertainty in its unit commitment and dispatch forecast by using Monte Carlo
211 sampling of stochastic variables, which include load, wholesale electricity and natural
212 gas prices, hydro generation, and thermal unit outages. PaR uses the same common
213 input assumptions that are used in the SO model, with resource-portfolio data provided
214 by the SO model results. The PVRR from the PaR model reflects a distribution of

215 system variable costs, including variable costs associated with existing contracts,
216 wholesale-market purchases and sales, fuel costs, variable operations and maintenance
217 costs, emissions costs, as applicable, and costs associated with energy or reserve
218 deficiencies. Fixed costs that do not change with system dispatch, including the cost of
219 DSM resources, fixed operations and maintenance costs, and the levelized revenue
220 requirement of capital additions for existing coal resources and potential new
221 generating resources, are based on the fixed costs from the SO model, which are
222 combined with the distribution of PaR variable costs to establish a distribution of
223 system PVRR for each simulation.

224 **Q. How has PacifiCorp historically used the SO model and PaR?**

225 A. PacifiCorp uses the SO model and PaR to produce and evaluate resource portfolios in
226 its IRP. PacifiCorp also uses these models to analyze resource-acquisition
227 opportunities, resource retirements, resource capital investments, and system
228 transmission projects. The models were used to support the successful acquisition of
229 the Chehalis combined-cycle plant, to support selection of the Lake Side 2 combined-
230 cycle resource through a RFP process, and to evaluate installation of emissions control
231 equipment. These models will also be used to evaluate bids in the soon-to-be-issued
232 2017R RFP, which is being issued to solicit bids for new wind resources.

233 **Q. Are the SO model and PaR the appropriate tools for analyzing the wind
234 repowering opportunity?**

235 A. Yes. The SO model and PaR are the appropriate modeling tools when evaluating
236 significant capital investments that influence PacifiCorp's resource mix and affect
237 least-cost dispatch of system resources. The SO model simultaneously and

238 endogenously evaluates capacity and energy trade-offs associated with resource capital
239 projects and is needed to understand how the type, timing, and location of future
240 resources might be affected by the wind repowering project. PaR provides additional
241 granularity on how wind repowering is projected to affect system operations,
242 recognizing that key system conditions are volatile and uncertain. Together, the SO
243 model and PaR are best suited to perform a net-benefit analysis for the wind repowering
244 opportunity that is consistent with long-standing least-cost, least-risk planning
245 principles applied in PacifiCorp's IRP.

246 **Q. How did PacifiCorp use PaR to assess stochastic system cost risk associated with**
247 **wind repowering?**

248 A. Just as it evaluates resource-portfolio alternatives in the IRP, PacifiCorp uses the
249 stochastic-mean PVRR and risk-adjusted PVRR, calculated from PaR study results, to
250 assess the stochastic system cost risk of repowering. With Monte Carlo sampling of
251 stochastic variables, PaR produces a distribution of system variable costs. The
252 stochastic-mean PVRR is the average of net variable operating costs from the
253 distribution of system variable costs, combined with system fixed costs from the SO
254 model. PacifiCorp uses a risk-adjusted PVRR to evaluate stochastic system cost risk.
255 The risk-adjusted PVRR incorporates the expected value of low-probability, high-cost
256 outcomes. The risk-adjusted PVRR is calculated by adding five percent of system
257 variable costs, from the 95th percentile of the distribution of system variable costs, to
258 the stochastic-mean PVRR.

259 When applied to the wind repowering analysis, the stochastic-mean PVRR
260 represents the expected level of system costs from cases with and without repowering.

261 The risk-adjusted PVRR is used to assess whether wind repowering causes a
262 disproportionate increase to system variable costs under low-probability, high-cost
263 system conditions.

264 **Q. Did PacifiCorp analyze how other assumptions affect its economic analysis of the**
265 **wind repowering project?**

266 A. Yes. In addition to assessing stochastic system cost risk, PacifiCorp analyzed the wind-
267 repowering project under a range of assumptions regarding wholesale market prices
268 and CO₂ policy (“price-policy”) assumptions. These assumptions drive NPC-related
269 benefits, and so it is important to understand how the net-benefit analysis is affected
270 under a range of potential outcomes. PacifiCorp developed low, medium, and high
271 scenarios for the market price of electricity and natural gas and zero, medium, and high
272 CO₂ price scenarios. Each pair of model simulations—with and without repowering, in
273 both the SO model and PaR—was analyzed under each combination of these price-
274 policy assumptions. I summarize the assumptions for each price-policy scenario later
275 in my testimony.

276 PacifiCorp also completed three sensitivity studies to assess how certain factors
277 affect the net benefits of the wind repowering project. The first sensitivity quantifies
278 how the net benefits of the project are affected by the depreciable life of repowered
279 facilities. PacifiCorp’s base analysis assumes that repowering will reset the 30-year
280 depreciable life of the asset. Assuming the possibility that wind facilities with modern
281 equipment might continue operating over a longer period, this sensitivity quantifies the
282 economic impact if the depreciable life of new equipment on a repowered facility were
283 reset at 40 years.

284 The second sensitivity quantifies how the net benefits of wind repowering are
285 affected when combined with 1,180 MW of new Wyoming wind resources (860 MW
286 of owned resources and 320 MW of contracted resources) and the Aeolus-to-
287 Bridger/Anticline transmission project. Consistent with PacifiCorp’s application for a
288 certificate for public convenience and necessity for the new wind and transmission
289 assets (filed concurrent with this wind repowering application), this sensitivity assumes
290 the new wind and transmission is operational by the end of October 2020.

291 The third sensitivity builds on the new-wind-and-transmission sensitivity case
292 by assessing how the net benefits of wind repowering are affected if the repowered
293 facilities are able to operate at their full generating capability. This sensitivity assumes
294 the additional capacity and energy is combined with the new wind and new
295 transmission included in the prior sensitivity. As described by Mr. Hemstreet,
296 PacifiCorp’s base analysis assumes that the repowered wind facilities continue to
297 operate within the limits of their existing LGIAs. The average incremental energy
298 output is expected to increase by approximately 19.2 percent if the repowered facilities
299 operate within their existing LGIA limits. If these limits are modified, the average
300 incremental energy output rises to 20.8 percent. PacifiCorp is studying whether these
301 LGIAs can be modified to increase incremental energy output from the repowered
302 facilities, which would increase the net benefits of repowering.

303 **Q. How did PacifiCorp assess which wind facilities to include in the scope of the wind**
304 **repowering project in this application?**

305 A. PacifiCorp completed a series of SO model and PaR studies to determine how the
306 system PVRR changes when a specific wind facility is added or removed from the

307 scope of the wind repowering project. Starting with the wind repowering scope
308 assumed in the 2017 IRP preferred portfolio, covering 905 MW of existing wind
309 resource capacity, PacifiCorp first removed the Leaning Juniper facility from the wind
310 repowering scope because it has the lowest expected annual average capacity factor
311 among the owned wind facilities in PacifiCorp's wind fleet. A wind facility's capacity
312 factor is a strong indicator of whether repowering is cost-effective because it is
313 representative of energy output and is therefore tied to the amount of PTCs that will be
314 generated if the facility is repowered. The risk-adjusted system PVRR from the case
315 eliminating Leaning Juniper from the wind repowering project scope was \$7 million
316 higher than the risk-adjusted system PVRR from the case including Leaning Juniper in
317 the project scope. Based on these results, Leaning Juniper remains within the scope of
318 the wind repowering project considered in this application.

319 Because repowering of the Leaning Juniper facility, which has the lowest
320 expected annual capacity factor relative to other wind facilities in PacifiCorp's fleet,
321 provides incremental net benefits, all remaining wind facilities within the project scope
322 would generate more PTCs and provide even larger incremental net benefits if
323 repowered. Consequently, PacifiCorp did not analyze any further reductions to the wind
324 repowering scope beyond its analysis of Leaning Juniper.

325 PacifiCorp next evaluated how expanding the wind repowering scope to include
326 Goodnoe Hills would affect the system PVRR. The risk-adjusted system PVRR from
327 the case including Goodnoe Hills in the project scope was \$20 million lower than the
328 system PVRR from the case without Goodnoe Hills. Based on these results, Goodnoe
329 Hills was added to the repowering project scope considered in this application. With

330 Goodnoe Hills included, the scope of the repowering project considered in this
331 application covers 999.1 MW of existing wind capacity—594 MW of this capacity is
332 located in Wyoming (Glenrock, Rolling Hills, Seven Mile Hill, High Plans, McFadden
333 Ridge, and Dunlap), 100.5 MW is located in Oregon (Leaning Juniper), and 304.6 MW
334 is located in Washington (Marengo and Goodnoe Hills).

335 **Q. What key assumptions did PacifiCorp update since analyzing the wind**
336 **repowering project in its 2017 IRP?**

337 A. Beyond the price-policy assumptions used to analyze a range of NPC-related benefits,
338 the updated wind repowering analysis reflects updated assumptions for up-front capital
339 costs, run-rate operating costs, and energy output for both the existing and repowered
340 wind facilities. PacifiCorp’s analysis assumes an up-front capital investment totaling
341 approximately \$1.13 billion with a 19.2 percent average increase in annual energy
342 output. The cost and performance assumptions for the wind facilities studied for this
343 application are summarized in Confidential Exhibit RMP____(RTL-1).

344 **Q. How did PacifiCorp model de-rates to its Wyoming 230-kV transmission system**
345 **when evaluating the wind repowering project?**

346 A. In its final 2017 IRP resource-portfolio screening process, PacifiCorp identified and
347 quantified reliability benefits associated with the Aeolus-to-Bridger/Anticline
348 transmission project. This new transmission project would eliminate de-rates caused by
349 outages on 230-kV transmission system elements. Historical outages on this part of
350 PacifiCorp’s transmission system indicate an average de-rate of 146 MW over
351 approximately 88 outage days per year, which equates to approximately one 146-MW,
352 24-hour outage every four days. Without knowing when these events might occur, de-

353 rates on the existing 230-kV transmission system were captured in the SO model and
354 PaR as a 36.5 MW reduction in the transfer capability from eastern Wyoming to the
355 Aeolus area. In the sensitivity performed to quantify how the net benefits of wind
356 repowering are affected when combined with new Wyoming wind resources and the
357 Aeolus-to-Bridger/Anticline transmission project, this de-rate assumption was
358 eliminated when the new transmission project is assumed to be placed in service at the
359 end of October 2020.

360 **Q. How did PacifiCorp model line-loss benefits associated with the Aeolus-to-**
361 **Bridger/Anticline transmission project when studying the wind repowering**
362 **project?**

363 A. Line-loss benefits are only applicable if the Aeolus-to-Bridger/Anticline transmission
364 project is built and therefore were only considered in the sensitivity performed to
365 quantify how the net benefits of wind repowering are affected when combined with
366 new Wyoming wind resources and the Aeolus-to-Bridger/Anticline transmission
367 project. For this sensitivity, when the Aeolus-to-Bridger/Anticline transmission project
368 is added in parallel to the existing transmission lines, resistance is reduced, which
369 lowers line losses. With reduced line losses, an incremental 11.6 average MW (“aMW”)
370 of energy, which equates to approximately 102 gigawatt hours (“GWh”), will be able
371 to flow out of eastern Wyoming each year. The line-loss benefit was reflected in the
372 SO model and PaR by reducing northeast Wyoming load by approximately 11.6 aMW
373 each year.

374 **Q. Did PacifiCorp analyze potential energy imbalance market (“EIM”) benefits in its**
375 **wind repowering analysis?**

376 A. Yes. In its final 2017 IRP resource-portfolio screening process, PacifiCorp described
377 how the EIM can provide potential benefits when incremental energy is added to
378 transmission-constrained areas of Wyoming. Unscheduled or unused transmission from
379 participating EIM entities enables more efficient power flows within the hour. With
380 increasing participation in the EIM, there will be increasing opportunities to move
381 incremental energy from Wyoming to offset higher-priced generation in the PacifiCorp
382 system or other EIM participants’ systems. The more efficient use of transmission that
383 is expected with growing participation in the EIM was captured in the wind repowering
384 analysis by increasing the transfer capability between the east and west sides of
385 PacifiCorp’s system by 300 MW (from the Jim Bridger plant to south-central Oregon).
386 The ability to more efficiently use intra-hour transmission from a growing list of EIM
387 participants is not driven by the wind repowering project; however, this increased
388 connectivity provides the opportunity to move low-cost incremental energy out of
389 transmission-constrained areas of Wyoming.

390 **Q. How did PacifiCorp account for the unrecovered investments in the original**
391 **equipment that will be replaced with new equipment?**

392 A. The economic analysis assumes that PacifiCorp will fully recover the unrecovered
393 investment in the original equipment and earn its authorized rate of return on the
394 unrecovered balance over the remainder of the original 30-year depreciable life of each
395 repowered facility. Mr. Larsen describes PacifiCorp’s proposed accounting treatment
396 for the replaced equipment.

397 **Q. Did PacifiCorp assume any salvage value for the equipment that will be replaced**
398 **with repowering?**

399 A. No. But any salvage value for the existing equipment would decrease the unrecovered
400 investment and increase customer benefits.

401 **ANNUAL REVENUE REQUIREMENT MODELING METHODOLOGY**

402 **Q. In addition to the system modeling used to calculate present-value net benefits**
403 **over a twenty-year planning period, has PacifiCorp forecasted the change in**
404 **nominal-annual revenue requirement due to the wind repowering project?**

405 A. Yes. The system PVRR from the SO model and PaR is calculated from an annual stream
406 of forecasted revenue requirement over a 20-year time frame, consistent with the
407 planning period in the IRP. The annual stream of forecasted revenue requirement
408 captures nominal revenue requirement for non-capital items (*e.g.*, NPC, fixed
409 operations and maintenance) and levelized revenue requirement for capital
410 expenditures. To estimate the annual revenue-requirement impacts of repowering,
411 project capital costs need to be considered in nominal terms (*i.e.*, not levelized).

412 **Q. Why is the capital revenue requirement used in the calculation of the system**
413 **PVRR from the SO model and PaR levelized?**

414 A. Levelization of capital revenue requirement is necessary in these models to avoid
415 potential distortions in the economic analysis of capital-intensive assets that have
416 different lives and in-service dates. Without levelization, this potential distortion is
417 driven by how capital costs are included in rate base over time. Capital revenue
418 requirement is generally highest in the first year an asset is placed in service and
419 declines over time as the asset depreciates.

420 Consider the potential implications of modeling nominal capital revenue
421 requirement for a future generating resource needed in 2036, the last year of the 2017
422 IRP planning period. If nominal capital revenue requirement were assumed, the model
423 would capture in its economic assessment of resource alternatives the highest, first-
424 year revenue requirement capital cost without having any foresight on the potential
425 benefits that resource would provide beyond 2036. If nominal capital costs were
426 applied, the model's economic assessment of resource alternatives for the 2036
427 resource need would inappropriately favor less capital-intensive projects or projects
428 having longer asset lives, even if those alternatives would increase system costs over
429 their remaining life. Levelized capital costs for assets that have different lives and in-
430 service dates is an established way to address these types of distortions in the
431 comparative economic analysis of resource alternatives.

432 **Q. How did PacifiCorp forecast the annual revenue-requirement impacts of the wind**
433 **repowering project?**

434 A. In the models that exclude repowered wind, the annual stream of costs for wind
435 facilities that are within the wind repowering scope, including levelized capital, are
436 removed from the annual stream of costs used to calculate the stochastic-mean system
437 PVRR. Similarly, in the simulation that includes repowered wind, the annual stream of
438 costs for repowered wind facilities, including levelized capital and PTCs, are
439 temporarily removed from the annual stream of costs used to calculate the stochastic-
440 mean PVRR. The differential in the remaining stream of annual costs, which includes
441 all system costs except for those associated with the wind facilities that are within the
442 wind repowering scope, represents the net system benefit caused by the wind

443 repowering project.

444 These data are disaggregated to isolate the estimated annual NPC benefits, other
445 non-NPC variable-cost benefits (*i.e.*, variable operations and maintenance and
446 emissions costs for those scenarios that include a CO₂ price assumption), and fixed-
447 cost benefits. To complete the annual revenue-requirement forecast, the change in fixed
448 costs for those wind facilities included in the wind repowering scope, including
449 nominal capital revenue requirement and PTCs, are added back in with the annual
450 system net benefits caused by wind repowering.

451 **Q. Over what time frame did PacifiCorp estimate the change in annual revenue**
452 **requirement due to the wind repowering project?**

453 A. The change in annual revenue requirement was estimated through 2050. This captures
454 the full 30-year life of the new equipment installed on repowered wind facilities.

455 **Q. How did PacifiCorp calculate the net annual benefits caused by wind repowering**
456 **beyond the 20-year forecast period used in PaR?**

457 A. The PaR forecast period runs from 2017 through 2036. The change in net system
458 benefits caused by wind repowering over the 2028-through-2036 time frame, expressed
459 in dollars-per-MWh of incremental energy output from wind repowering, were used to
460 estimate the change in system net benefits from 2037 through 2050. This calculation
461 was performed in several steps.

462 First, the net system benefits caused by wind repowering were divided by the
463 change in incremental energy expected from the wind repowering project, as modeled
464 in PaR over the 2028-through-2036 time frame. Next, the net system benefits per MWh
465 of incremental energy from the repowered wind projects over the 2028-through-2036

466 time frame were levelized. These levelized results were extended out through 2050 at
467 inflation. The levelized net system benefits per MWh of incremental energy output
468 from the repowered wind projects over the 2037-through-2050 time frame were then
469 multiplied by the change in incremental energy output from repowered wind projects
470 over the same period.

471 **Q. Why did PacifiCorp use PaR results from the 2028-through-2036 time frame to**
472 **extend system cost impacts out through 2050?**

473 A. Consistent with the 2017 IRP, PacifiCorp's wind repowering analysis assumes the Dave
474 Johnston coal plant, located in eastern Wyoming, retires at the end of 2027. When this
475 plant is assumed to retire, transmission congestion affecting energy output from
476 resources in eastern Wyoming, where many repowered wind resources are located, is
477 reduced. The incremental energy output from repowered wind resources provides more
478 system benefits when not constrained by transmission limitations. Consequently, the
479 net system benefits caused by wind repowering over the 2028-through-2036 time
480 frame, after Dave Johnston is assumed to retire, is representative of net system benefits
481 that could be expected beyond 2036.

482 **Q. Did PacifiCorp calculate a PVRR(d) for the wind repowering project using its**
483 **estimate of annual revenue-requirement impacts projected out through 2050?**

484 A. Yes.

485 **Q. Does the PVRR(d) calculated from estimated annual revenue requirement**
486 **through 2050 capture wind repowering benefits not included in the PVRR(d)**
487 **calculated from the 20-year forecast coming out of the SO model and PaR ?**

488 A. Yes. The PVRR(d) calculated off of estimated annual revenue requirement extended

489 out through 2050 captures the significant increase in projected wind energy output
490 beyond the 20-year forecast period.

491 **Q. Why is there a significant increase in projected wind energy output beyond the**
492 **20-year forecast period ending 2036?**

493 A. The change in wind energy output between cases with and without repowering
494 experiences a step change in the 2036-through-2040 time frame, when the wind
495 facilities, originally placed in-service during the 2006-through-2010 time frame, would
496 otherwise have hit the end of their depreciable life. Before the 2036-through-2040 time
497 frame, the change in wind energy output reflects the incremental energy production that
498 results from installing modern equipment on repowered wind assets. Beyond the 2036-
499 through-2040 time frame, the change in wind energy output between a case with and
500 without repowering reflects the full energy output from the repowered wind facilities
501 that would otherwise be retired.

502 **PRICE-POLICY SCENARIOS**

503 **Q. Please explain why price-policy scenarios are important when analyzing the wind**
504 **repowering project.**

505 A. Wholesale-power prices, often set by natural gas prices, and the system cost impacts of
506 potential CO₂ policies influence the forecast of net system benefits from wind
507 repowering. Wholesale-power prices and CO₂ policy outcomes affect the value of
508 system energy, the dispatch of system resources, and PacifiCorp's resource mix.
509 Consequently, wholesale-power prices and CO₂ policy assumptions affect NPC
510 benefits, non-NPC variable cost benefits, and system fixed-cost benefits of wind
511 repowering. Because wholesale-power prices and CO₂ policy outcomes are both

512 uncertain and important drivers to the wind repowering analysis, PacifiCorp studied
513 the economics of the wind repowering project under a range of different price-policy
514 scenarios.

515 **Q. What price-policy scenarios did PacifiCorp use in its wind repowering analysis?**

516 A. PacifiCorp analyzed the wind repowering project under nine different price-policy
517 scenarios. PacifiCorp developed three wholesale-power price scenarios (low, medium,
518 and high), and similarly developed three CO₂ policy scenarios (zero, medium, and
519 high). The nine price-policy scenarios developed for the wind repowering analysis
520 reflect different combinations of these scenario assumptions.

521 Considering that there is a high level of correlation between wholesale-power
522 prices and natural gas prices, the wholesale-power price scenarios were based on a
523 range of natural gas price assumptions. This ensures consistency between power price
524 and natural gas price assumptions for each scenario. PacifiCorp implemented its CO₂
525 policy assumptions through a CO₂ price, expressed in dollars-per-ton.

526 While it is unlikely that the CPP will be implemented in its current form, it is
527 possible that future CO₂ policies targeting electric-sector emissions could be adopted
528 and impose incremental costs to drive emission reductions. CO₂ price assumptions used
529 in the price-policy scenarios are not intended to mimic a specific type of policy
530 mechanism (*i.e.*, a tax or an allowance price under a cap-and-trade program), but are
531 intended to recognize that there might be future CO₂ policies that impose a cost to
532 reduce emissions. Table 1 summarizes the nine price-policy scenarios used to analyze
533 the wind repowering project.

Table 1. Price-Policy Scenarios

Price-Policy Scenario	Natural-Gas Prices (Levelized \$/MMBtu)*	CO ₂ Price Description
Low Gas, Zero CO ₂	\$3.19	\$0/ton
Low Gas, Medium CO ₂	\$3.19	\$3.41/ton in 2025 growing to \$14.40/ton in 2036
Low Gas, High CO ₂	\$3.19	\$4.73/ton in 2025 growing to \$38.42/ton in 2036
Medium Gas, Zero CO ₂	\$4.07	\$0/ton
Medium Gas, Medium CO ₂	\$4.13	\$3.41/ton in 2025 growing to \$14.40/ton in 2036
Medium Gas, High CO ₂	\$4.13	\$4.73/ton in 2025 growing to \$38.42/ton in 2036
High Gas, Zero CO ₂	\$5.83	\$0/ton
High Gas, Medium CO ₂	\$5.83	\$3.41/ton in 2025 growing to \$14.40/ton in 2036
High Gas, High CO ₂	\$5.83	\$4.73/ton in 2025 growing to \$38.42/ton in 2036
*Nominal levelized Henry Hub natural-gas price from 2018 through 2036.		

534 **Q. Please describe the natural gas price assumptions used in the price-policy**
 535 **scenarios.**

536 **A.** The medium-natural-gas-price assumptions that are paired with zero CO₂ prices reflect
 537 natural gas prices from PacifiCorp’s official forward price curve (“OFPC”) dated April
 538 26, 2017. The OFPC uses observed forward market prices as of April 26, 2017, for
 539 72 months, followed by a 12-month transition to natural gas prices based on a forecast
 540 developed by [REDACTED]. The medium, low, and high natural gas price assumptions
 541 used for all other scenarios were chosen after reviewing a range of credible third-party
 542 forecasts developed by [REDACTED], and the U.S. Department of Energy’s Energy
 543 Information Administration. Exhibit RMP___(RTL-2) shows the range in natural gas


REDACTED

544 price assumptions from these third-party forecasts relative to those adopted for the
545 price-policy scenarios to evaluate the wind repowering project.

546 The low-natural-gas-price assumption was derived from a low-price scenario
547 developed by [REDACTED], which is based on surging growth in price-inelastic associated gas,
548 technology improvements, stagnant liquefied natural gas exports, and an ever-
549 expanding resource base. The medium-natural-gas-price assumption, which is used
550 beyond month 84 in the April 2017 OFPC, and in all months when medium-natural-gas
551 prices are paired with medium or low CO₂ price assumptions, is based on a base-case
552 forecast from [REDACTED] that is reasonably aligned with other base-case forecasts. The
553 high-natural-gas-price assumption was based on a high-price scenario from [REDACTED]
554 [REDACTED]. The high-price scenario is based on risk aversion, whereby natural gas
555 developers are reluctant to commit capital before demand, and the associated price
556 response, materializes. This gives rise to exaggerated boom-bust cycles (cyclical
557 periods of high prices and low prices). PacifiCorp smoothed the boom-bust cycle in the
558 third party's high-price scenario because the specific timing of these cycles are
559 extremely difficult to project with reasonable accuracy.

560 Figure 1 shows Henry Hub natural gas price assumptions from the April 2017
561 OFPC, low, medium, and high natural gas price scenarios. The April 2017 OFPC
562 forecast only differs from the medium-natural-gas-price assumption in that it reflects
563 observed market forwards through the first 72 months followed by a 12-month
564 transition to [REDACTED] base-case forecast.


Figure 1. Nominal Natural Gas Price Scenarios



565 Q. Please describe the CO₂ price assumptions used in the price-policy scenarios.

566 A. As with natural gas prices, the medium and high CO₂ price assumptions are based on
567 third-party projections from [REDACTED]. Both forecasters assume CO₂ prices
568 start in 2025. To bracket the low end of potential policy outcomes, PacifiCorp assumes
569 there are no future policies adopted that would require incremental costs to achieve
570 emissions reductions in the electric sector. In this scenario, the assumed CO₂ price is
571 zero. Figure 2 shows the three CO₂ price assumptions used to analyze the wind
572 repowering project.

Figure 2. Nominal CO2 Price Scenarios



573

SYSTEM MODELING PRICE-POLICY RESULTS

574 **Q. Please summarize the PVRR(d) results calculated from the SO model and PaR**
575 **through 2036.**

576 **A.** Table 2 summarizes the PVRR(d) results for each price-policy scenario. The PVRR(d)
577 between cases with and without wind repowering are shown from the SO model and
578 from PaR, which was used to calculate both the stochastic-mean PVRR(d) and the risk-
579 adjusted PVRR(d). The data that was used to calculate the PVRR(d) results shown in
580 the table are provided as Exhibit RMP___(RTL-3).

**Table 2. SO Model and PaR PVRR(d)
(Benefit)/Cost of Wind Repowering (\$ million)**

Price-Policy Scenario	SO Model PVRR(d)	PaR Stochastic-Mean PVRR(d)	PaR Risk-Adjusted PVRR(d)
Low Gas, Zero CO ₂	\$33	\$43	\$44
Low Gas, Medium CO ₂	\$0	\$9	\$8
Low Gas, High CO ₂	(\$18)	(\$17)	(\$19)
Medium Gas, Zero CO ₂	(\$33)	(\$24)	(\$25)
Medium Gas, Medium CO ₂	(\$22)	(\$13)	(\$15)
Medium Gas, High CO ₂	(\$41)	(\$35)	(\$36)
High Gas, Zero CO ₂	(\$75)	(\$40)	(\$43)
High Gas, Medium CO ₂	(\$64)	(\$34)	(\$37)
High Gas, High CO ₂	(\$103)	(\$80)	(\$85)

581 Over a 20-year period, before accounting for the increase in incremental energy
582 output beyond 2036, the wind repowering project reduces customer costs in seven out
583 of nine price-policy scenarios. This trend occurs in the PVRR(d) calculated from both
584 the SO model and PaR. The only price-policy scenarios without net customer benefits
585 are those assuming the lowest natural gas prices when paired with either medium or
586 zero CO₂ price assumptions. The PVRR(d) results show customer benefits under the
587 price-policy scenario with low natural gas prices and high CO₂ prices, in all three of
588 the medium-natural-gas-price scenarios, and in all three of the high-natural-gas-price
589 scenarios. Under the central price-policy scenario, assuming medium-natural-gas
590 prices and medium CO₂ prices, the PVRR(d) benefits range between \$13 million, when
591 based upon PaR-stochastic-mean results, and \$22 million, when based upon SO model
592 results.

593 The PVRR(d) results show that the benefits of the wind repowering project
594 increase with natural gas prices and CO₂ prices. PVRR(d) results for scenarios where
595 medium CO₂ prices are assumed with medium or high natural gas prices show a slight
596 drop in benefits relative the zero-CO₂-price scenarios. This tends to be driven by

597 changes to the timing of new resources in the outer years of the 20-year forecast period
598 and would not likely persist if longer simulation periods were feasible.

599 **Q. Is there incremental customer upside to the PVRR(d) results calculated from the**
600 **SO and PaR models through 2036?**

601 A. Yes. The PVRR(d) results presented in Table 2 do not reflect the potential value of
602 RECs generated by the incremental wind energy output from the repowered facilities.
603 Customer benefits for all price-policy scenarios would improve by approximately
604 \$4 million for every dollar assigned to the incremental RECs that will be generated
605 from the repowered wind facilities through 2036.

606 **Q. Why do the PaR results tend to show a different level of benefits from the wind**
607 **repowering project when compared to the results from the SO model?**

608 A. The two models assess the system impacts of the wind repowering project in different
609 ways. The SO model is designed to dynamically assess system dispatch, with less
610 granularity than PaR, while optimizing the selection of resources to the portfolio over
611 time. PaR is able to dynamically assess system dispatch, with more granularity than the
612 SO model and with consideration of stochastic risk variables; however, PaR does not
613 modify the type, timing, size and location of resources in the portfolio in response to
614 its more detailed assessment of system dispatch. In evaluating differences in annual
615 system costs between the two models, PaR's ability to better simulate system dispatch
616 relative to the SO model results in lower benefits from repowering being reported from
617 PaR in the earlier years of the forecast horizon. Because PaR cannot modify resource
618 selections in response to its assessment of system dispatch, this effect is softened over

619 the longer term, when changes to the resource portfolio in response to wind repowering
620 are more notable.

621 **Q. Does one of these two models provide a better assessment of the wind repowering**
622 **project relative to the other?**

623 A. No. The two models are simply different, and both are useful in establishing a range of
624 wind repowering benefits through the 20-year forecast period. Importantly, the
625 PVRR(d) results from both models show customer benefits across the same set of price-
626 policy scenarios with consistent trends in the difference in PVRR(d) results between
627 price-policy scenarios. The consistency in the trend of forecasted benefits between the
628 two models, each having its own strengths, shows that the wind repowering benefits
629 are robust across a range of price-policy assumptions and when analyzed using different
630 modeling tools.

631 **Q. How do the risk-adjusted PVRR(d) results compare to the stochastic-mean**
632 **PVRR(d) results?**

633 A. The risk-adjusted PVRR(d) results are very similar to the stochastic-mean PVRR(d)
634 results. This indicates that the wind repowering project does not materially affect high-
635 cost, low-probability outcomes that can occur due to volatility in stochastic variables
636 like load, wholesale-market prices, hydro generation, and thermal-unit outages.

637 **Q. Did PacifiCorp review how repowered wind facilities located in Wyoming affect**
638 **the dispatch of Wyoming coal plants?**


639 A. Yes. After repowering, the incremental energy output from the repowered wind
640 facilities located in Wyoming could contribute to additional transmission congestion
641 and require re-dispatch of coal resources in the region. Re-dispatch of coal resources

REDACTED

642 can reduce NPC-related benefits in those hours where increased congestion would
643 restrict the otherwise economic use of these assets to serve load or as a source for
644 wholesale-market sales. To assess the potential level of re-dispatch that might be
645 associated with repowering, PacifiCorp reviewed the modeled changes in Wyoming
646 coal generation.

647 Confidential Figure 3 summarizes the change in annual coal generation from
648 Wyoming coal resources due to wind repowering for the medium-natural-gas-and-
649 medium-CO₂ price-policy scenario. The figure shows that re-dispatch of Wyoming coal
650 resources leads to [REDACTED]
651 [REDACTED], when component failures on existing wind resource equipment is
652 assumed to reduce output for specific wind turbines until the new equipment is
653 installed. After the wind repowering project is completed, re-dispatch leads to [REDACTED]
654 [REDACTED] the Dave Johnston plant and Jim Bridger Unit 3 are assumed to
655 retire at the end of 2027 and 2028, respectively. Between 2021 and 2028, average
656 annual coal generation for PacifiCorp's ownership interest in Wyoming coal resources
657 [REDACTED]
658 [REDACTED]. In the later years of the forecast
659 period, changes in coal generation are influenced by changes to the resource portfolio.
660 Wyoming coal plant re-dispatch for all price-policy scenarios is provided in
661 Confidential Exhibit RMP___(RTL-4).

Confidential Figure 3. Change in Annual Generation from Wyoming Coal Plants Due to Repowering



662 **ANNUAL REVENUE REQUIREMENT PRICE-POLICY RESULTS**

663 **Q. Please summarize the PVRR(d) results calculated from the change in annual**
664 **revenue requirement through 2050.**

665 **A.** Table 3 summarizes the PVRR(d) results for each price-policy scenario calculated off
666 of the change in annual nominal revenue requirement through 2050. The annual data
667 over the period 2017 through 2050 that was used to calculate the PVRR(d) results
668 shown in the table are provided as Exhibit RMP___(RTL-5).

**Table 3. Nominal Revenue Requirement PVRR(d)
(Benefit)/Cost of Wind Repowering (\$ million)**

Price-Policy Scenario	Annual Revenue Requirement PVRR(d)
Low Gas, Zero CO ₂	(\$41)
Low Gas, Medium CO ₂	(\$245)
Low Gas, High CO ₂	(\$344)
Medium Gas, Zero CO ₂	(\$362)
Medium Gas, Medium CO ₂	(\$359)
Medium Gas, High CO ₂	(\$401)
High Gas, Zero CO ₂	(\$400)
High Gas, Medium CO ₂	(\$274)
High Gas, High CO ₂	(\$589)

669 When calculated through 2050, which covers the remaining life of the
670 repowered facilities, the wind repowering project reduces customer costs in all nine
671 price-policy scenarios, with PVRR(d) benefits ranging from \$41 million in the low-
672 natural-gas-and-zero-CO₂ scenario to \$589 million in the high-natural-gas-and-high-
673 CO₂ scenario. Under the central price-policy scenario, assuming medium natural gas
674 prices and medium CO₂ prices, the PVRR(d) benefits are \$359 million.


675 **Q. What causes the substantial increase in PVRR(d) benefits when calculated off of**
676 **nominal revenue requirement through 2050 relative to the PVRR(d) results**
677 **calculated from the SO model and PaR results through 2036?**

678 A. The PVRR(d) calculated from estimated annual revenue requirement through 2050
679 picks up the sizable increase in incremental wind energy output beyond the 20-year
680 forecast period analyzed with the SO model and PaR. As discussed earlier in my
681 testimony, the change in wind energy output between cases with and without wind
682 repowering experiences a step change beyond this 20-year period, when the existing
683 wind facilities would otherwise have hit the end of their depreciable life. Beyond the
684 20-year forecast period, the change in wind energy output between cases with and
685 without repowering reflects the full energy output from the repowered wind facilities.

686 Figure 4 shows the incremental change in wind energy output resulting from the
687 repowering project. Incremental energy output associated with wind repowering
688 progressively increases over the 2036-through-2040 period, as wind facilities originally
689 placed in service in the 2006-through-2010 time frame would have otherwise hit the end
690 of their lives. Before 2036, and once all of the wind resources within the project scope
691 are repowered, the average annual incremental increase in wind energy output is

692 approximately 551 GWh. Beyond 2040, and before the new equipment hits the end of its
 693 depreciable life, the average annual incremental increase in wind-energy output is
 694 approximately 3,283 GWh.

Figure 4. Change in Incremental Wind Energy Output Due to Wind Repowering (GWh)



695 **Q. Is there incremental customer upside to the PVRR(d) results calculated from the**
 696 **change in estimated annual revenue requirement through 2050?**


697 A. Yes. As in the case with the PVRR(d) results calculated from the SO model and PaR
 698 results through 2036, the PVRR(d) results presented in Table 3 do not reflect the
 699 potential value of RECs produced by the repowered facilities. Customer benefits for all
 700 price-policy scenarios would improve by approximately \$11 million for every dollar
 701 assigned to the incremental RECs that will be generated from the wind repowering
 702 project through 2050.

703 **Q. Please describe the change in annual nominal revenue requirement from the wind**
 704 **repowering project.**

705 A. Figure 5 shows the estimated change in nominal revenue requirement due to wind

706 repowering for the medium-natural-gas-and-medium-CO₂ price-policy scenario on a
 707 total-system basis. The change in nominal revenue requirement shown in the figure
 708 reflects project costs, including capital revenue requirement (*i.e.*, depreciation, return,
 709 income taxes, and property taxes), operations and maintenance expenses, the Wyoming
 710 wind-production tax, and PTCs. The project costs are netted against system impacts of
 711 wind repowering, reflecting the change in NPC, emissions, non-NPC variable costs,
 712 and system fixed costs that are affected by, but not directly associated with, the wind
 713 repowering project.

Figure 5. Total-System Annual Revenue Requirement with Wind Repowering (\$ million)



714 Before repowering, the reduction in wind energy output due to component
 715 failures on the existing wind resource equipment is assumed to reduce wind energy
 716 output for specific wind turbines until the time new equipment is installed. This
 717 contributes to a slight increase in revenue requirement in 2017 and 2018 (\$2 million to
 718 \$4 million, total system). All but the Dunlap facility, which is repowered toward the
 719 end of 2020, are repowered in 2019. Over the 2019-to-2020 time frame, project costs

720 reflecting partial-year capital revenue requirement net of PTCs and system cost
721 impacts, cause slight changes to revenue requirement.

722 The wind repowering project reduces revenue requirement soon after the new
723 equipment is placed in service in the 2019-to-2020 time frame. From 2021 through
724 2028, annual revenue requirement is reduced as PTC benefits increase with inflation
725 and the new equipment continues to depreciate. On a total-system basis, annual revenue
726 requirement is reduced by \$19 million in 2021. The reduction in annual revenue
727 requirement increases to \$115 million by 2028. Revenue requirement increases once
728 the PTCs expire toward the end of 2030. Annual revenue requirement is reduced over
729 the 2037-through-2050 time frame when, as discussed earlier in my testimony, the
730 incremental wind energy output associated with wind repowering increases
731 substantially.

732 SENSITIVITY STUDY RESULTS

733 **Q. Please summarize the results of the sensitivity that assumes the new wind**
734 **equipment has a 40-year-depreciable life.**

735 A. Table 4 summarizes the PVRR(d) results for the sensitivity assuming a 40-year life for
736 new equipment. To assess the relative impact of the 40-year life, the PVRR(d) results
737 were calculated through 2036 based on SO model and PaR results and are presented
738 alongside the benchmark study in which wind repowering was evaluated with a 30-
739 year life. Medium-natural-gas and medium-CO₂ price-policy assumptions were applied
740 to this sensitivity.

**Table 4. 40-Year-Life Sensitivity
(Benefit)/Cost of Wind Repowering (\$ million)**

Model	Sensitivity PVRR(d)	Benchmark PVRR(d)	Change in PVRR(d)
SO Model	(\$60)	(\$22)	(\$38)
PaR Stochastic-Mean	(\$50)	(\$13)	(\$37)
PaR Risk-Adjusted	(\$52)	(\$15)	(\$37)

741 If the new equipment were depreciated over a 40-year life, reduced book
 742 depreciation would drive lower annual revenue requirement. In this sensitivity,
 743 PVRR(d) benefits increase by approximately \$37 million relative to the benchmark
 744 case assuming a 30-year life for the new equipment.

745 **Q. Please summarize the results of the sensitivity that includes new incremental wind
 746 and the planned Aeolus-to-Bridger/Anticline transmission project.**

747 A. Table 5 summarizes the PVRR(d) results for the sensitivity assuming wind repowering
 748 is implemented along with 1,180 MW of new Wyoming wind and the Aeolus-to-
 749 Bridger/Anticline transmission project. To assess the relative impact of the new wind
 750 and transmission, the PVRR(d) results were calculated through 2036 based on SO
 751 model and PaR results and are presented alongside the benchmark study in which wind
 752 repowering was evaluated as a stand-alone project. Medium-natural-gas and medium-
 753 CO₂ price-policy assumptions were applied to this sensitivity.

**Table 5. New Wind and Aeolus-to-Bridger/Anticline Sensitivity
(Benefit)/Cost of Wind Repowering (\$ million)**

Model	Sensitivity PVRR(d)	Benchmark PVRR(d)	Change in PVRR(d)
SO Model	(\$114)	(\$22)	(\$91)
PaR Stochastic-Mean	(\$104)	(\$13)	(\$90)
PaR Risk-Adjusted	(\$116)	(\$15)	(\$101)

754 When the wind repowering project is combined with 1,180 MW of new
 755 Wyoming wind and the Aeolus-to-Bridger/Anticline transmission project, PVRR(d)

756 benefits increase by between \$91 million to \$101 million relative to the benchmark
 757 case. This sensitivity shows that wind repowering benefits persist when combined with
 758 new wind and new transmission, and that the new wind and new transmission will
 759 provide significant incremental benefits for customers.

760 **Q. Please summarize the results of the sensitivity that assumes repowered wind**
 761 **facilities can operate at their full capacity.**

762 A. Table 6 summarizes the PVRR(d) results for the sensitivity that assumes repowered
 763 wind facilities can operate at their full capacity. The increased energy and capacity
 764 assumed in this sensitivity is in addition to the new wind and transmission assumed in
 765 the prior sensitivity. To assess the relative impact of this assumption on revenue
 766 requirement, the PVRR(d) results were calculated through 2036 based on SO model
 767 and PaR results and are presented alongside the benchmark study assuming repowered
 768 wind resources operate within existing LGIA limits. Medium-natural-gas and medium-
 769 CO₂ price-policy assumptions were applied to this sensitivity.

**Table 6. Increased Wind Repower Capacity Sensitivity
 (Benefit)/Cost of Wind Repowering (\$ million)**

Model	Sensitivity PVRR(d)	Benchmark PVRR(d)	Change in PVRR(d)
SO Model	(\$109)	(\$114)	\$4
PaR Stochastic-Mean	(\$106)	(\$104)	(\$2)
PaR Risk-Adjusted	(\$118)	(\$116)	(\$2)

770 If PacifiCorp is able to modify its LGIAs, the repowered wind facilities will be
 771 able to produce additional energy in those hours where wind energy output would
 772 otherwise have been curtailed to stay within current LGIA limits. If these LGIAs are
 773 modified, PVRR(d) this study suggests there may be additional upside to customer
 774 benefits, but they are not likely to be substantial.

775 **CONCLUSION**

776 **Q. Please summarize the conclusions of your testimony.**

777 A. PacifiCorp’s analysis supports repowering approximately 999 MW of existing wind
778 resource capacity located in Wyoming, Oregon, and Washington. The repowered wind
779 facilities will qualify for an additional ten years of federal PTCs, produce more energy,
780 reset the 30-year depreciable life of the assets, and reduce run-rate operating costs. The
781 economic analysis of the wind repowering opportunity demonstrates that net benefits,
782 which include federal PTC benefits, NPC benefits, other system variable-cost benefits,
783 and system fixed-cost benefits, more than outweigh net project costs.

784 **Q. What do you recommend?**

785 A. As supported by my economic analysis, I recommend that the Commission determine
786 that the decision to repower certain wind facilities is prudent and in the public interest
787 and approve the Application as filed, including the request for continued cost recovery
788 of the wind equipment that will be replaced and the proposed ratemaking treatment for
789 the new costs and benefits of the wind repowering project.

790 **Q. Does this conclude your direct testimony?**

791 A. Yes.