Rocky Mountain Power Docket No. 14-035-114 Witness: Joelle R. Steward

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ROCKY MOUNTAIN POWER

Rebuttal Testimony of Joelle R. Steward

July 2017

Q. Are you the same Joelle R. Steward who presented direct testimony in this
 proceeding?

3 A. Yes I am.

4 **Purpose and Summary of Rebuttal Testimony**

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Q.

What is the purpose of your rebuttal testimony?

6 My rebuttal testimony is comprised of three sections. In Section I, I respond to the A. 7 direct testimony submitted by other parties on June 8, 2017, related to the Company's 8 proposed changes to the net metering program and new rates for net metering 9 customers. Specifically, I respond to testimony submitted by the Division of Public 10 Utilities ("DPU") witnesses Dr. Artie Powell and Stan Faryniarz; the Office of 11 Consumer Services ("OCS") witnesses Michele Beck, James Daniel, and Danny 12 Martinez; the Energy Freedom Coalition of America ("EFCA") witness Eliah 13 Gilfenbaum; Utah Clean Energy ("UCE") witness Melissa Whited; Vote Solar 14 witnesses Dr. David DeRamus and Rick Gilliam; Vivint Solar witnesses Thomas 15 Plagemann and Richard Collins; and Sierra Club witness Allison Clements.

In Section II, I present the Company's revised rate design proposal. The revised rate design proposal includes optional energy-based time-of-use ("TOU") rates in addition to the demand-based time of use rates.

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In Section III, I discuss a succession program to net metering.

20 Q. Please summarize your general observations from the other parties' direct 21 testimony.

A. The majority of parties appear to recognize that net metering ("NEM") as we know it
today is not sustainable in the long-run, or that at least some level of change is

24 warranted, particularly related to how exported energy is compensated. There is, however, a wide difference of opinion on the timing and scope of necessary change. 25 The DPU and the OCS, who concur with the Company's findings from the compliance 26 27 analysis that the costs of NEM exceed its benefits, recommend that the Commission 28 lower the cap on the NEM program in this proceeding and move to a new program 29 model. For the new program, they recommend that the Commission initiate a new 30 proceeding to develop a formulaic rate to compensate customers for exported power 31 from on-site generation while giving different treatment to rates for energy consumed 32 from the grid.¹ While not going as far as the DPU and OCS in their recommendations, 33 many of the other parties implicitly acknowledge that the current NEM program is problematic, particularly the export rate.² EFCA, for instance, argues that the value 34 could be higher than the retail rate.³ Many parties also cite the contentious debates that 35 36 have been occurring around the country related to proposed changes to net metering and the ensuing uncertainty and confusion for all stakeholders.⁴ In all, the parties' 37 38 arguments demonstrate the need for clear direction from the Commission on changes 39 to the current ratemaking model for customers with private generation, and the timing 40 for the changes. While the Company supports the recommendation of the DPU and

¹ OCS witness Michele Beck Direct Testimony, ll. 323-433; DPU witness Artie Powell, Ph.D. Direct Testimony, ll. 454-582.

² See e.g., EFCA argues that adjusting the export rate may resolve the Company's concerns requiring a separate class. EFCA witness Eliah Gilfenbaum Direct Testimony, ll. 414-20. UCE recommends that, if a change in the NEM program is necessary, compensation for excess generation should be reduced. UCE witness Melissa Whited Direct Testimony, ll. 559-63. Vivint proposes an alternative that would step down the value for exported energy. Vivint Solar witness Thomas Plagemann Direct Testimony, ll. 281-3. Vote Solar proposes a declining compensation rate for net excess energy to address the Company's concerns about cost shifting. Vote Solar witness Rick Gilliam Direct Testimony, ll. 760-3.

³ Gilfenbaum Direct Testimony, ll. 483-9.

⁴ See e.g., Sierra Club witness Alison Clements Direct Testimony, ll. 690-982. Plagemann Direct Testimony, ll. 32-47. Vivint Solar witness Dan Black Direct Testimony, ll. 112-38.

41 OCS to lower the cap on the NEM program and begin the transition to a new program 42 now, which I discuss in more detail in Section III, the majority of my rebuttal testimony 43 specifically addresses the NEM program that is the subject of this proceeding, and the 44 Company's proposed changes to that program to minimize cost shifting.

45

Q. Please summarize your rebuttal testimony.

46 A. In Section I, I continue to support the need for a separate class and rate design for 47 residential NEM customers in order to eliminate the cost shifting that occurs and to 48 send correct price signals. I show that other parties' attempts to argue that the data does 49 not support a separate class are without merit. For the proposed rate design, I rebut the 50 arguments that transformers should not be included in the customer charge, that a 51 minimum bill provides a solution to cost shifting, that demand charges are 52 inappropriate, and that the proposed rates will result in unacceptable bill increases for 53 NEM customers. I also continue to support the need for elimination of the average retail 54 rate option for large non-residential customers, showing that the average retail rate 55 option is in excess of benefits. Regarding the Company's proposed application fees, I 56 continue to support the proposed \$60 fee for Level 1 interconnections, which no party 57 opposed, but withdraw the request for increases in Level 2 and 3 interconnection fees 58 at this time. Lastly, I provide additional details on the Company's proposed deferral for 59 incremental revenue from Schedule 5.

In Section II, I present updated rates for residential NEM customers. In addition
to the time of use demand-based rates I presented in my direct testimony, I propose an
optional TOU energy-based rate for NEM customers. The TOU energy-based rate
option includes a \$28 per month customer charge in order to better track costs. For the

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64		TOU demand-based rate, the customer charge has been updated to \$13 per month,
65		based on the updated cost of service results presented by Company witness Robert M.
66		Meredith.
67		In Section III, I support the proposal by the DPU to lower the cap on the current
68		NEM program and develop a new successor program for private generation. The new
69		program would provide a separate compensation rate for all exported energy.
70	I.	Rebuttal of Other Parties Direct Testimony
71	Q.	Please explain how your rebuttal of other parties' direct testimony is organized.
72	A.	I organized this section around the issues I addressed in my direct testimony:
73		• Whether residential NEM customers should be in a separate class;
74		• Rate design for residential NEM customers;
75		• Non-residential excess energy credits;
76		• Proposed application fees; and
77		• The proposed deferral for any incremental revenues from the proposed
78		residential rate design.
79	NEM	Customer Class
80	Q.	Please summarize other parties' positions on whether residential NEM customers
81		should be in a separate rate class.
82	A.	DPU witnesses Dr. Powell and Mr. Faryniarz present analyses on differences in usage
83		characteristics of residential NEM customers compared to non-NEM customers, and
84		argue that these differences may not conclusively support the need to establish
85		residential NEM customers into separate class today. ⁵ However, the DPU identifies

⁵ Powell Direct Testimony, ll. 58-61; DPU witness Stan Faryniarz Direct Testimony, ll. 90-4.

aspects of NEM that indicate a separate class may be important.⁶ The OCS agrees with 86 87 the Company that NEM customers have different usage characteristics than other 88 residential customers, but does not believe it is necessary to create a separate NEM 89 customer class.⁷ EFCA, USEA, Vote Solar, and UCE oppose the creation of a separate 90 class for NEM customers, arguing that the behind-the-meter reduction should be treated 91 similar to other types of energy efficiency, that analysis excluding crediting shows 92 similar usage as non-NEM customers, and that the differences are no more significant than the differences between other intra-class subsidies that occur.⁸ 93

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Q. How do you respond to the DPU's testimony?

95 I appreciate the additional statistical analysis the DPU has contributed to the record; Α. however, unlike the DPU, I find the DPU's analysis supports the creation of a separate 96 97 residential NEM class now, particularly when considering that residential NEM 98 customers significantly underpay the costs of serving and therefore shift costs to other 99 customers. In addition, NEM customers fundamentally use the system differently-to 100 back-up their own generation, akin to partial requirements customers, and to export the 101 generation that exceeds their immediate needs. As such, changing the current structure 102 by creating a separate class for NEM customers is in the public interest.

103 Q. How do the DPU's usage and cost of service characteristics analyses support the 104 creation for a separate residential NEM class?

105 A. First, Dr. Powell presents analyses that confirm that:

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(1) The customer profiles between residential NEM and non-NEM are distinct

⁶ Powell Direct Testimony, ll. 272-80.

⁷ Beck Direct Testimony, ll. 70-4.

⁸ *See e.g.*, Gilfenbaum Direct Testimony, ll. 51-5, 374-420. Whited Direct Testimony, ll. 51-4, 357-62. Stanley Direct Testimony, ll. 197-210. DeRamus Direct Testimony, ll. 85-101. Gilliam Direct Testimony, ll. 661-72.

107	despite the similarity of their average usage;
108	(2) The rate of change in usage by NEM customers during the day is
109	significantly larger than non-NEM customers;
110	(3) The variation in load factors for NEM customers is greater; and
111	(4) NEM customers have notably lower load factors. ⁹
112	These markers indicate that residential NEM customers have different
113	characteristics or, at the very least, that differences in rate design treatment may be
114	warranted to better address these differences among customers.
115	Second, Dr. Powell notes that separating NEM customers from the residential
116	class may better capture the benefits NEM customers bring to the system, allowing the
117	design of their rates to reflect those benefits. ¹⁰ In this regard, Table 1 below shows the
118	differences in the unit costs by function between non-NEM and NEM residential
119	customers. NEM customers have an overall lower cost of service, particularly in the
120	generation and transmission functions, once the one-time program administration costs
121	are removed. Accordingly, these lower costs would be passed on to NEM customers
122	through lower rates in a separate class rather than diluted as part of the larger residential
123	class.

⁹ Powell Direct Testimony, ll. 315-439. ¹⁰ *Id.* at ll. 440-50.

An	nual Functional Cost	s per Customer	
	Residential Non-Net Metering	Residential Net Metering	Percentage Difference
Generation	\$580	\$468	-19%
Transmission	\$136	\$127	-6%
Distribution	\$240	\$238	-1%
Retail	\$40	\$57	43%
Miscellaneous	\$5	\$4	-5%
Total	\$1,000	\$894	-11%

Table	1.

124 Third, Mr. Faryniarz demonstrates that NEM compensation for exported power 125 at a retail rate that exceeds net power costs results in the significantly lower parity to 126 cost of service than non-NEM customers, and therefore results in a net cost to other 127 customers.¹¹ Correcting this cost shift under the NEM regime requires a different rate 128 design for NEM customers that better balances cost of service for consumption from 129 the system with compensation for exported power.

130Q.EFCA witness Mr. Gilfenbaum and Vote Solar witnesses Dr. DeRamus and Mr.131Gilliam argue that a separate class should not be created because once132compensation for exported power is removed, NEM customers are providing133approximately the same contribution to cost of service as non-NEM and that it is134normal for there to be a small amount of variation within a customer class.¹² Do135you agree?

A. No. First, excluding compensation for exported power is irrelevant because NEM
equates compensation for exported power with retail rates. Utah Code Ann. § 54-15-

¹¹ Faryniarz Direct Testimony, ll. 775-855.

¹² Gilfenbaum Direct Testimony, ll. 374-420; DeRamus Direct Testimony, ll. 746-750; Gilliam Direct Testimony, ll. 417-25.

138 104 requires netting of exported power against consumption within a billing period 139 except for "excess customer-generated electricity," which is defined in Utah Code Ann. 140 § 54-15-102(6) as the customer-generated electricity in excess of the customers 141 consumption during the monthly billing period. In other words, only the kWh output 142 that exceeds the usage during the billing period (i.e., is banked), may be credited at a 143 different value that is at least avoided cost. Only about 6 percent of exported power is 144 banked; therefore, even if the Commission adjusted the compensation rate for excess energy, as allowed under the law, the vast majority of exported power would be 145 compensated at the retail rate.¹³ 146

147 Second, for the reasons discussed above, I disagree that the variations in usage 148 characteristics between NEM and non-NEM are insignificant and should be dismissed, 149 particularly when considering the inadequacies of the current rate design to recover 150 costs. Also, looking at just the contribution to the class cost of service (even if compensation for exported power is excluded), or at just load factor, will not show if 151 152 the rate design is actually sending an economic price signal or whether the design is 153 capable of distinguishing between different service requirements within the class. Net 154 metering customers have distinguished themselves through a variety of factors as I 155 outlined above, some of which result in higher costs and others in lower costs.

Q. OCS witness Ms. Beck states that, while she agrees that NEM customers have a
different usage characteristic, a separate class is not needed. How do you respond?
A. Keeping NEM in the same class but requiring different rate designs for NEM customers
does not fully capture the differences and actually results in higher rates for NEM

¹³ This also provides perspective on UCE's recommendation that if any change is made it be limited to excess generation. Whited Direct Testimony, ll. 599-603.

160 customers since the benefits of the NEM class are diluted in the larger class. In addition, 161 keeping NEM customers in the current residential class, particularly as the number of 162 NEM customers grows, will increase the intra-class cost shifting and mask the price 163 signal for the value of exported power.

164 Vote Solar witness Dr. DeRamus argues that the NEM customers, who are Q. 165 typically higher use customers before installing distributed generation, are responding to the rates established by the Commission to discourage high levels 166 of usage so NEM customers should not be singled out. Further, he argues that 167 168 conflating costs with monthly energy consumption rather than peak load is a 169 problem with the overall rates, not with NEM customers per se.¹⁴ Do you agree?

170 A. To some extent, I agree with Dr. DeRamus on this point. Indeed, there are problems 171 with the current residential rate structure that cause high use customers to subsidize 172 other customers with the tiered rate design. However, I don't believe that justifies keeping the current rate structure for the NEM program, particularly in light of the 173 174 required detailed review and evaluation the Commission has sought through this 175 proceeding. NEM customers are not merely akin to customers reducing usage through 176 energy efficiency. High-use customers do not stop being high use consumers, but 177 instead offset a portion of their requirements with private generation, which requires a 178 back-up from the utility. NEM also requires compensation for exported energy at rates 179 in excess of comparable or competitively-priced energy. Together, these differences 180 lead to a significant under-recovery of costs through the NEM program, not just typical 181 lost margins associated with energy efficiency programs. The uniqueness of the NEM

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¹⁴ DeRamus Direct Testimony, ll. 402-36.

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program, and customers with on-site generation, has already been established and therefore it is appropriate to address changes for these customers.

184 Q. Dr. DeRamus argues that NEM customers' load factors are not different from 185 those of non-NEM customers.¹⁵ Is this true?

No. Mr. DeRamus applied the Kolmogorov-Smirnov ("KS") test to assert that NEM 186 A. 187 and non-NEM load factors are not significantly different from one another. The KS indeed tests whether two distributions are significantly different from one another. 188 However, it is documented that when testing small sample sizes the power of the KS 189 test is limited.¹⁶ Comparing the annual load factors for NEM and non-NEM customers, 190 191 as Dr. DeRamus did, provides a sample size of 52 NEM customers, which is not 192 sufficient for the KS test. If Dr. DeRamus's claim that there is no difference in load 193 factors between the groups is true, this should be true when comparing monthly load 194 factors. Therefore, the Company calculated the monthly load factors for NEM and 195 non-NEM customers from the data provided in response to a data request provided to 196 the DPU (DPU DR 4.3). Using the monthly load factors increases the observations 197 from 52 to 621. The Company applied the KS test to the monthly load factors from 198 both groups—NEM and non-NEM. Applying the KS test to the two customer samples 199 results in a p-value of 0.0024, lower than the 0.1 standard, meaning that there are 200 significant differences between the distributions of observations of the two samples. This is consistent with the finding by the DPU using the KS test.¹⁷ Applying the KS 201

¹⁵ *Id.* at ll. 935-46.

¹⁶ Razali, Nornadiah M. and Bee Wah Yap, January 2011, *Power Comparisons of Shapiro-Wilk, Kolmogorov-Smirnov, Lilliefors and Anderson-Darling Tests*, Journal of Statistical Modeling and Analytics, Vol 2, No.1, 21-33.

¹⁷ Powell Direct Testimony, ll. 354-6.

test to compare monthly load factors for NEM customers and non-NEM customers
demonstrates that the distribution of load factors between the two groups is statistically
different.

Q. What analysis did Ms. Whited prepare to support her belief that residential net
 metering customers should not be on a separate class?

A. Ms. Whited provided her Figure 3 to purportedly show the hourly profiles on the peak day in 2015 (June 30, 2015) for all non-NEM customers whose maximum kW during that peak day was less than 10 kilowatts with the average profiles from the four strata from the residential NEM load research study.¹⁸ She concludes that since the lines for the residential NEM strata are within the same general range as the individual hourly profiles for all other non-residential customers that "NEM customers are well within the range of other residential customers."¹⁹

Q. Does Ms. Whited's Figure 3, along with her observation, provide any evidence that separate class treatment for residential net metering customers would be inappropriate?

A. No. Ms. Whited's Figure 3 is not an apples to apples comparison of non-NEM and
NEM residential customers. There are numerous ways in which the information that
she compares for non-NEM customers is on a different basis than for NEM customers.
She removes larger non-NEM customers but does not do the same for NEM customers.
She shows every single individual sample profile for non-NEM customers, but only
shows average strata profiles for NEM customers. For NEM customers, the different
strata are shown separately, but non-NEM profiles are just shown in one blue jumble.

¹⁹ *Id.* at ll. 297-8.

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¹⁸ Whited Direct Testimony, ll. 291-301.

Besides the inconsistency between the information she shows between NEM 224 225 and non-NEM customers, the point she tries to make with her illustration is unclear and 226 misleading. She shows that the average NEM strata profiles generally fall within the 227 range provided by *all* non-NEM customers. Her illustration does not demonstrate that 228 the overall profile shape for NEM customers is the same as for non-NEM customers. 229 Using her logic, the profiles for a streetlight or a small irrigation customer could be 230 shown to fall within the range of residential customers. Visually comparing an average 231 from one set of customers to all possible data points from another set of customers is 232 not useful.

Figure 3 in my direct testimony shows that the shapes for the overall profiles, which were prepared on a consistent basis for NEM and non-NEM customers are different on the peak day on June 30, 2015. Her analysis does nothing to refute this difference.

237 <u>Residential NEM Rate Design</u>

Q. Please summarize parties' positions on the proposed rate design for residential
 NEM customers, which included a \$15 monthly customer charge, a demand
 charge during on-peak periods, and an energy charge.

A. Parties generally opposed some or all of the Company's proposed rate design. The DPU opposes the proposed customer charge of \$15 per month but supports the consideration of both a demand charge and an alternative TOU energy-based option.²⁰ The OCS supports a different customer charge and a requirement for TOU rates in the next general rate case.²¹ Sierra Club, UCE, Vivint Solar, and Vote Solar oppose the

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²⁰ Faryniarz Direct Testimony, ll. 1345-7.

²¹ Beck Direct Testimony, ll. 600-4.

246 Company's proposed rate design, and in particular, argue that the demand charge is 247 inappropriate for residential customers but offer some support for a TOU energy-based 248 rate (but available to all residential customers).²²

Q. Is the Company proposing changes to the proposed rate design in this rebuttalfiling?

- A. Yes. In Section II of my testimony, I explain the Company's changes to the proposed
 rate design. The Company is proposing to include an optional TOU energy option in
 addition to the TOU demand-based option for residential NEM customers.
- Q. Regarding the proposed customer charge, DPU witness Mr. Faryniarz argues that
 the cost of service for NEM customers does not support a higher customer charge
 that includes the costs of transformers, as proposed by the Company.²³ Similarly,
 OCS witness Mr. Martinez also opposes the inclusion of transformer costs in the

258 customer charge.²⁴ Do you agree with their arguments?

A. No. Both Mr. Faryniarz and Mr. Martinez rely on the Commission's 1985 method for
determining customer charges, which limits the customer charge to only costs that serve
individual customers, not costs for equipment that is shared by customers.²⁵ However,
as DPU witness Dr. Powell notes: "rate-making must be sufficiently flexible to adapt
to changing circumstances."²⁶ A strict adherence to a Commission determination 32
years ago does not serve the public interest. The changes in technology, growth in

²² See e.g., Clements Direct Testimony, ll. 436-43. Whited Direct Testimony, ll. 48-50, 541-5, 564-8. Plagemann Direct Testimony, ll. 48-167. DeRamus Direct Testimony, ll. 102-18, 128-32. Gilliam Direct Testimony, ll. 79-85, 121-31.

²³ Faryniarz Direct Testimony, ll. 123-7.

²⁴ Martinez Direct Testimony, ll. 195-210.

²⁵ Martinez Direct Testimony, ll. 62-226; Faryniarz Direct Testimony, ll. 680-733.

²⁶ Powell Direct Testimony, ll. 201-2.

265 customer generation, and in particular, the present circumstance of net metering— 266 which over-simplistically equates the retail rate with a value for exported energy, 267 resulting in a cost shift to other customers—warrant a re-evaluation of the past 268 approach for a proper balance between price signals and cost recovery.²⁷

As Table 1 above shows, functional cost of service differences between NEM and non-NEM exist, with NEM customers exhibiting lower costs for generation and transmission and higher costs for distribution and retail functions. The distribution costs include substations, poles, wires, transformers, service drops, and meters. Table provides a breakdown of the distribution costs and comparison to non-NEM customers.

Residential Customer Costs				
8	Residential Non-Net Metering	Residential Net Metering	Percentage Difference	
Transformer	\$50.66	\$63.87	26%	
Meter	\$7.83	\$14.67	87%	
Service	\$32.25	\$38.09	18%	
Retail	\$39.64	\$56.64	43%	
Miscellaneous	\$4.54	\$4.32	-5%	
Annual Total	\$134.93	\$177.59	32%	
Monthly Total	\$11.24	\$14.80	32%	

Table 2.

Table 2 shows that the most significant cost differences are in meters, transformers, and retail, which excludes the costs to be recovered in the Company's proposed application fee. The Company proposes to include the transformer costs in the customer charge for

²⁷ The Commission has recognized that changes to methodologies are warranted in light of changing conditions (*see e.g.*, Docket No. 12-035-100, Order on Phase II Issues (August 16, 2013) p. 18, where the Commission justified changing the avoided costs methodology stating "... [t]his action will ensure our method for determining indicative prices will continue to reflect changing avoided costs in light of changing conditions ...")

278 NEM customers with the demand-based TOU rate proposal. As I discuss later, the 279 Company is proposing a higher customer charge that includes all distribution system 280 elements with its new proposed TOU energy option.

281 Q. Please explain why NEM is a reasonable basis for the Commission to alter its past 282 decisions for the calculation customer charges.

283 The cost of service study shows that NEM results in a significant under-recovery of A. 284 costs, which is largely due to using the retail rate to value exported energy. With the 285 costs of infrastructure necessary to support customers' access to the grid included in 286 volumetric rates, customers can offset charges for infrastructure they relied on for their 287 own consumption through the NEM kWh netting and banking process. The majority of 288 costs in rates reflect the embedded costs of the facilities in place and serving customers 289 today, therefore, these are costs that do not go away, regardless of consumption levels. 290 In fact, as Company witness Mr. Douglas L. Marx shows, rooftop solar does not 291 necessarily lead to a reduction in the size of local distribution infrastructure because 292 these customers use the distribution system for both consumption and export. 293 Therefore, to ensure cost recovery from the individuals who rely on and benefit from 294 this infrastructure, the costs must be removed from the volumetric charges.

Q. The OCS recognizes a difference in meter costs between residential NEM and non NEM customers and proposes a customer charge of \$8.50.²⁸ Please respond.

A. The current minimum bill for residential customers is \$8.00 per month. So while I appreciate the OCS's recognition of cost differences for NEM customers, the proposal still leaves a significant portion of fixed costs subject to volumetric rates and

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²⁸ Martinez Direct Testimony, Il. 220-6.

300 netting/banking.

Q. Vivint Solar argues that transformers should not be in the customer charge for
 NEM customers because Mr. Marx's arguments that NEM customers put a
 greater burden on the grid are "a red herring and only applied in limited cases."²⁹
 Does the Company's proposed customer charge reflect any additional costs for
 prospectively putting a greater burden on the grid, as Mr. Marx showed?

A. No. While Mr. Marx shows that NEM can actually lead to the need for additional costs
to support the excess energy placed on the grid, the Company's proposed customer
charge does not reflect any additional costs beyond those in the test period (scaled back
to the final rates approved in the last general rate case). Therefore, Mr. Collins argument
is misleading.

311 Q. Vivint Solar argues that "a reasonable and small minimum bill" would be a better 312 solution than a higher customer charge because it promotes conservation.³⁰ Do 313 you agree?

314 No. A minimum bill is often proposed as a solution in NEM proceedings, but is A. 315 essentially a red herring because it makes it appear that the utility would get better fixed 316 cost recovery. In reality however, unless the charge is set high enough, it produces 317 insufficient revenue. For example, the Company's current minimum bill is \$8.00 per 318 month. A 50 percent increase in the minimum to \$12.00 per month for NEM customers 319 would apply to only 3 percent more bills, based on the 2015 test period. In addition, it 320 only "promotes conservation" in that it leaves recovery of fixed costs in the volumetric 321 rate, regardless if that is actually an economic price signal.

²⁹ Collins Direct Testimony, ll. 725-50.

³⁰ Plagemann Direct Testimony, ll. 84-93.

322 Q. Do you agree with parties' arguments that demand charges for residential 323 customers are inappropriate?³¹

No. As several parties note, there is a growing interest by utilities across the country in 324 A. 325 incorporating demand changes into residential rate design due to changes in technology.³² But arguments like the Sierra Club's that residential customers are "not 326 in a position to respond to demand price signals" or that demand charges are simply 327 too inconvenient are unfounded.³³ The Arizona Public Service Company has had 328 voluntary TOU demand and energy options for residential customers for decades. A 329 330 study published in 2016 looked at customers that switched from a TOU energy rate to 331 a TOU demand-based rate and found that about 60 percent of customers were able to reduce their summer peak demand an average of 12.5 percent.³⁴ Responding to a 332 333 demand signal would be a change for residential customers, but it does not mean demand charges are not appropriate or useful in this context. In fact, demand charges 334 335 are a more appropriate, economic price signal than tiered energy rates, for the reasons 336 I discussed in my direct testimony. Gaining an understanding to stagger appliance use during peak periods provides a more cost-causation-based price signal than just 337 338 reducing overall usage.

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Sierra Club claims that residential customers "have almost no perceptible impact on the grid based on their own individual usage" so therefore, "the grid would

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³¹ Clements Direct Testimony, ll. 309-57; Whited Direct Testimony, ll. 363-512; Plagemann Direct Testimony, ll.102-4.

³² Clements Direct Testimony, ll. 339-46. Whited Direct Testimony, ll. 484-512. Plagemann Direct Testimony, ll. 32-6, 100-2.

³³ Clements Direct Testimony, ll. 329-57.

³⁴ Leland R. Snook and Meghan H. Grabel, *Dispelling the myths of residential rate reform: Why an evolving grid requires a modern approach to electricity pricing*, THE ENERGY LAW J. 29:3 (Apr. 2016) at 72-76.

341 barely notice unless hundreds or thousands of other customers did the same thing at the same time,"³⁵ and compares this to an industrial customer. This ignores the fact the all 342 non-residential classes, other than lighting, are subject to demand charges, not just large 343 344 industrial customers and that applying the on-peak demand price signal to hundreds or 345 thousands of customers is precisely how to discourage more costly on-peak usage. An 346 individual customer reducing usage to the peak period demand price signal is of more 347 value to the grid than if the same customer merely reduces his or her usage by the 348 corresponding amount in non-peak periods during a billing month in response to tiered 349 energy rates.

350 I similarly disagree with UCE witness Ms. Whited's arguments that demand charges reduce incentives for energy efficiency, that a reduction in energy charges will 351 352 lead to an increase in usage, and that the demand charges violate the Bonbright principle of simplicity.³⁶ While demand charges are a different signal for residential 353 354 customers, they are still a price signal for efficiency—a more targeted and valuable 355 signal for efficiency than tiered rates. The Company's proposed rate design is also more 356 simplistic than the current tiered rates and customers do not necessarily respond to individual billing components, but to average prices or overall bills.³⁷ 357

³⁵ Clements Direct Testimony, Il. 322-26.

³⁶ Whited Direct Testimony, ll. 457-66.

³⁷ Koichiro Ito, *Do Consumers Respond to Marginal or Average Price? Evidence from Nonlinear Electricity Pricing*, Energy Institute at Haas (October 2012).

358 Q. Several witnesses argue that if there were a new rate design adopted for customer
 359 generators, a residential TOU energy-based rate rather than a demand-based rate
 360 would be more appropriate.³⁸ How do you respond?

A. In this rebuttal filing, the Company is proposing to offer an optional energy-based TOU rate in addition to the demand-based TOU rate initially proposed. The proposed rates are described in Section II of my testimony. These two options will help customers adjust to new time-based price signals and ultimately choose the rate that most advantageously reflects his or her desired consumption.

366 Q. Several parties argue that the proposed new rates will result in an unacceptable 367 bill increase for NEM customers.³⁹ Do you agree?

No. The increase is only in comparison to what would otherwise occur. Put otherwise, 368 A. 369 just because a bill increases to an amount that is actually reflective of the costs imposed 370 by a customer does not mean that the increase is unacceptable. In this context, as the 371 Company's cost of service analysis shows, NEM customers have been receiving a 372 windfall under the current program and have been paying substantially less than their 373 cost of service. In addition, it's not an actual increase to customers because the 374 Company proposes to apply Schedule 5 rate to only *new* NEM customers (submitting 375 applications after December 9, 2016). When a customer opts for NEM after this proceeding, the overall average bill result would still be a decrease, as shown on pages 376 377 2 and 3 in Exhibit RMP (JRS-1R).

³⁸ Beck Direct Testimony, ll. 600-4; Daniel Direct Testimony, ll. 292-9; Whited Direct Testimony, ll. 564-8.

³⁹ Whited Direct Testimony, ll. 160-70. Clements Direct Testimony, ll. 358-414. Plagemann Direct Testimony, ll. 145-67.

378 Large Non-Residential Excess Energy Credits

Q. Please summarize other parties' testimony in response to the Company's proposal to eliminate the option for the average retail rate credit for excess energy for large non-residential customers.

A. Only the DPU and the OCS briefly addressed the Company's proposal in testimony. Mr. Faryniarz for the DPU doesn't make a specific recommendation but notes the importance of correctly valuing exports for all NEM customers, including nonresidential.⁴⁰ For the OCS, Ms. Beck notes that it would be important to evaluate whether all NEM customers should receive the same compensation rate and whether additional changes are necessary in a post-NEM environment.⁴¹

388 Q. Based on testimony, are you altering your proposal to eliminate the average retail 389 rate option for large non-residential customers?

390 No. As both the DPU and OCS note, there should be consideration of consistency in A. 391 the value of exported energy across the classes, and the current large non-residential 392 option for compensation of excess energy at the average retail rate is in excess of the 393 benefits, and therefore should be eliminated. For example, Table 3 below compares the 394 benefit of the net metering program at the system, state, and customer class level for 395 Schedules 6, 8, and 10 from the updated analysis presented in Company witness Mr. 396 Meredith's rebuttal testimony. This shows that the benefits provided by large non-397 residential net metering customers are all less than the average retail price option those 398 customers can receive for their excess energy.

⁴⁰ Faryniarz Direct Testimony, ll. 1197-1204.

⁴¹ Beck Direct Testimony, ll. 466-73.

	Benefit of the Net Me	etering Program (S/MWh)	
8	data ay data baktara ay salahara ya	At the Customer Class Level		
At the System Level	At the State Level	Schedule 6	Schedule 8	Schedule 10
27.18	57.21	54.12	69.88	45.80
Avera	age Retail Rate on Schee Effective July	dule 135 Special (1, 2016 (\$/MWh)		
Schedule 6	Schedule 6A	Schedule 6B	Schedule 8	Schedule 10
84.50	117.87	108.91	75.51	75.62

399 **Q.** If the average retail rates are more than the benefit of the net metering program,

400 why isn't there a larger net cost for large non-residential customer classes?

A. Schedule 6, Schedule 8, and Schedule 10 customers primarily receive value for their
private generation through their onsite generation or the generation that is netted within
the month at energy charges instead of at the full average retail rate. The full average
retail rate is only available for excess credits that are banked from a prior month. Table
405 4 below shows the average cost of bill credits for the large non-residential customer
classes.

Table 4

Net Metering Cost of Bill Credits (\$/MWh)			
Schedule 6	Schedule 8	Schedule 10	
46.82	38.55	46.52	

407 Since large non-residential customers are subject to demand charges, the 408 average cost of bill credits for these customer classes is well below the average retail 409 rates shown in Table 3. The costs and benefits of the NEM program analysis shows a 410 smaller net cost for large non-residential classes as compared to the residential class 411 because of lower bill credit levels for large non-residential classes. This is a direct result 412 of the more cost-based rate structures for large non-residential customers. The

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413 Company recommends that the current rate structure for customers on Schedule 6, 6A, 414 6B, 8, and 10 who choose to participate in the NEM program remain in place, since 415 those structures do not cause these customers to pay amounts that are far off from what 416 cost of service analysis indicates they should pay. Compensating these customers for a 417 prior month's over-generation at a higher rate, however, has no basis in cost and should 418 be eliminated as an option for future large non-residential NEM customers.

419 <u>Application Fees</u>

420 Q. Did any party oppose the Company's proposed waiver of R746-312-13 and the
421 implementation of new application fees for Level 1 interconnection requests and
422 changes to the fees for Levels 2 and 3?

A. No party opposed the waiver and implementation of the \$60 application fee for Level
1 interconnection requests. The OCS, however, recommended that the proposed
increases in the Level 2 and 3 fees should stay the same until the next general rate case.
The OCS also recommends that the Commission consider a formal rulemaking to
review R746-312-13 on a longer-term basis.⁴²

428 Q. Do you agree with the recommendations by the OCS?

A. In part. The Company can agree to withdraw the proposed increases for Level 2 and 3
interconnection applications at this time. The Company also supports the OCS's
recommendation for the Commission to consider a formal rulemaking to review R746312-13 on a longer-term basis. In fact, an update to the rule section may be appropriate
to address the availability of battery storage at customer locations, in addition to
interconnection of generation facilities. However, the Company believes that the

⁴² Martinez Direct Testimony, ll. 295-321.

rulemaking may consider changes in costs for Level 2 and 3, not just limit a change in
fees to a general rate case as these are set in rules.

437 <u>Proposed Deferral for Incremental Revenue from Schedule 5</u>

438 Q. Did any party comment on the Company's proposed deferral for incremental 439 revenue from Schedule 5?

440 Only one. The OCS opposes the Company's proposal to establish deferred accounting A. 441 for any incremental amount associated with new rates until the next general rate case. The OCS witness Mr. Daniel argues that the proposal does not include enough 442 443 information or specifics on the deferral account for the Commission to make a decision. 444 The OCS's questions include: how will the increased revenues be calculated; when, 445 and over what period would the increased revenues be returned to customers; how will 446 the increased revenues be assigned or allocated to customer classes; and will there be a true-up provision and, if so, how will it work?⁴³ 447

448 Q. How would the Company calculate the revenue difference?

449 Each month, the billing components would be extracted for Schedule 5 customers from A. 450 the billing system. From those billing components, actual base revenue under Schedule 451 5 and what base revenue would have been under Schedule 1 would be calculated and 452 compared. The incremental difference between Schedule 5 revenue and Schedule 1 453 revenue for all bills during the month would be applied to the balancing account, plus 454 any carrying charge on the balance. The Company would use the carrying charge rate 455 approved by the Commission in Docket No. 15-035-69. Exhibit RMP (JRS-2R) 456 provides an example of the calculation.

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⁴³ Daniel Direct Testimony, ll. 317-68.

457 The Company would begin the deferral once customers begin taking service on 458 Schedule 5, following the first monthly billing. The deferral would continue with all 459 customer billings until the effective date of the Company's next general rate case.

460 Q. When and over what period does the Company propose to return the deferral to461 customers?

A. The Company proposes to begin amortizing the deferral at the time of the next general
rate case. The Company would make a specific proposal in the general rate case filing,
including, the proposed period over which to amortize the balance. Other parties would
be able to propose an alternative at that time as well.

466 Q. How does the Company propose to allocate the deferral balance to customer
467 classes?

468 A. The deferral revenue balance would be allocated back to the residential Schedule 1469 class.

470 Q. Does the Company propose a true-up provision?

A. The Company would make a specific proposal in the next general rate case filing. If
amortization is embedded in base rates, there would not be a true-up. If the amortization
is done through a separate adjustment, a true-up provision would likely be included.
The size of a deferral balance is a factor that the Company would consider at the time
of the next general rate case as it makes its proposal for amortization.

476 II. Revised Schedule 5 Rate Design

- 477 Q. Is the Company proposing any changes to the originally proposed Schedule 5
 478 rates?
- 479 A. Yes. The Company has two changes to the Schedule 5 rates I proposed in direct

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480 testimony. First, the Company updated the Schedule 5 TOU demand-based rates in the 481 initial filing based upon the updated NEM Breakout COS analysis presented by 482 Company witness Mr. Meredith in his rebuttal testimony. The rates are calculated using 483 the same logic as discussed in my direct testimony, but they also reflect a correction to the billing units for the on-peak demand charge.⁴⁴ Table 5 below shows the updated 484 485 prices compared to the proposed prices presented in direct testimony. The updates and 486 the correction to the demand charge billing units result in reductions to the customer, 487 demand, and energy charges as compared to Company's direct filing.

Schedule 5 - Residential Service			
for Customer Generators			
	Proposed Price		
	Direct Filing	Revised Rebuttal Filing	
Customer Charge			
1 Phase	\$15.00	\$13.00	
3 Phase	\$30.00	\$26.00	
Demand Charge			
On-peak (\$/kW)*	\$9.02	\$8.25	
Energy Charges			
All kWh (¢/kWh)*	3.8143	3.6374	
*On-peak periods: Monday-Friday (ex October - April: 8:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m May - September: 3:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.	n. and 3:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.n	ı.	

Table 5 – Proposed Prices Compared to Prices Proposed in Direct Filing

488 Q. What is the second proposed change to Schedule 5?

489 In response to the testimonies of other parties, the Company proposes to include an A. 490 optional TOU energy-based rate in addition to the TOU demand-based rate. Providing 491 both a demand-focused TOU option and an energy-focused TOU option gives

⁴⁴ See Joelle R. Steward Direct Testimony, Il. 289-304 and 399-422.

492 customers more flexibility to choose an option that works for their household.

493 Q. How were the rates designed for the energy focused TOU option?

A. The off-peak energy charge was set to the same 3.6374 cents per kilowatt hour energy
charge as in the demand focused TOU option, and the customer charge was set at \$28
per month instead of \$13 per month. The on-peak energy charge was then set to recover
the remaining revenue requirement. The on- and off-peak TOU periods are identical
between both options. Table 6 shows the proposed prices for both of the Company's
proposed options.

	Proposed Price		
	Option 1 - Demand Focused Time-of-Use	Option 2 - Energy Focused Time-of-Use	
Customer Charge			
1 Phase	\$13.00	\$28.00	
3 Phase	\$26.00	\$56.00	
Demand Charge			
On-peak (\$/kW)*	\$8.25	N/A	
Energy Charges			
On-peak kWh (c/kWh)*	3.6374	28.553	
Off-peak kWh (¢/kWh)*	3.6374	3.6374	

Table	6
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500 Q. Why is the Company proposing a higher customer charge for the energy focused

501 **TOU option?**


A. Without a higher customer charge, an energy focused TOU rate that still includes
netting and banking does not provide a sufficient level of fixed cost recovery.
Customers on such a rate can offset all of their bill except for the customer charge by

simply installing enough rooftop solar panels. The proposed \$28 customer charge for
the energy-focused TOU option is designed to recover all customer services and
distribution costs.

508 Q. What evidence shows that an energy focused TOU rate without a higher customer
509 charge provides an insufficient level of fixed cost recovery?

510 A. To understand how well different rate options track the recovery of costs incurred to 511 serve a customer, the Company prepared an analysis that examines how the cost of 512 service would change for a customer who installs different sized rooftop solar systems 513 relative to the bill savings that customer would achieve from different rate options. 514 Specifically, the Company examined a typical NEM customer with 1,000 kWh of 515 monthly energy consumption against different levels of generation that would offset 10 516 percent, 25 percent, 50 percent, 75 percent, and 100 percent of full requirements usage. 517 To estimate cost of service at these levels of solar adoption, the change in the 518 customer's overall share of cost-causing customer characteristics was measured after 519 applying the estimated solar profile at different magnitudes. See Figure 1 below for a 520 comparison of bill savings and change in cost of service at different levels of rooftop 521 solar penetration for both the Company's proposed demand focused TOU option and 522 an energy focused TOU option that has the same \$13 customer charge, as well as the 523 current Schedule 1 rates.


Figure 1. Cost of Service Compared to Bill Savings on Demand Focused TOU and Energy Focused TOU



524 Figure 1 shows that the demand-based TOU option tracks more closely to cost 525 of service than an energy-based option or the Schedule 1 rates, particularly when a 526 customer installs larger private generation systems.

527 To achieve better fixed cost recovery, the Company recommends that a \$28 528 customer charge be used for an energy focused TOU option. Figure 2 below shows how 529 an energy focused TOU with a higher \$28 customer charge better tracks cost of service.

Figure 2. Cost of Service Compared to Bill Savings on Demand Focused TOU and Energy Focused TOU with a \$28 Customer Charge



Q. Have you prepared an exhibit that shows examples of the potential bill impacts
for net metering customers on Schedule 5 compared to current Schedule 1
residential rates?

A. Yes. Exhibit RMP___(JRS-1R) shows the proposed rate and a monthly bill comparison at different usage for the proposed Schedule 5 rates in the same format as in Exhibit RMP___(JRS-7), which was provided with my direct testimony. Page 2 of Exhibit RMP___(JRS-1R) shows the potential bill impacts for the Company's proposed demand-based TOU option. Page 3 shows the potential bill impacts for the Company's proposed energy-based TOU option.

539 Q. How does the Company propose to implement these rate options?

A. The Company will add a provision to the application for interconnection for the customer to elect which rate option they would like to choose. If the customer does not indicate a selection at that time, the default will be to place the customer on the demandbased option. The customer will be allowed to change his or her selection at any point during the first year. After the first year, a customer may change rate options once in a
12-month period. The Company will work with stakeholders to develop educational
materials to be available to customers to assist their understanding of the new rates.

547 Q. Several parties argue that the Commission should not or cannot approve new rates 548 outside of a general rate case.⁴⁵ Do you agree?

- A. No. This argument runs counter to the Commission's decision on the intervenors'
 motions for summary judgment and motions to dismiss, in which the intervenors made
 the same assertion. In its February 23, 2017, Consolidated Order Denying Dispositive
 Motions, the Commission specifically ruled that the Legislature did not intend for the
 Commission "to refrain from fulfilling its obligations under the Statute until and unless
- 553 Commission "to refrain from fulfilling its obligations under the Statute until and unless
- a general rate case is initiated.⁴⁶ Rather, the Commission explained:

555 As they are now, the issues of the cost to serve net metering customers and the appropriate pricing for their services were matters of substantial 556 controversy. In our view, the Statute constitutes the instructions and 557 558 authority the legislature elected to give the PSC for the purpose of 559 addressing these issues. As numerous parties have pointed out, as long 560 as these issues remain unresolved, the rooftop solar market is operating 561 under uncertainty and consumers are without accurate price signaling in 562 deciding whether to invest in rooftop solar. These issues are better 563 resolved sooner rather than later. If the legislature had intended for us to act only in the context of the then pending or a later filed general rate 564 565 case, it could have made its intentions plain. Instead, we believe the legislature was responding to the specific circumstances and 566 567 controversy surrounding net metering and empowered the PSC to act to resolve it.47 568

- 569 Given this, intervenor arguments to the contrary are further attempts to re-
- 570

Given unis, intervenor arguments to the contrary are further attempts to it

litigate issues and are irrelevant to this proceeding. The Company agrees with the

- ⁴⁶ Docket No. 14-035-114, Consolidated Order Denying Dispositive Motions, at 7 (Utah P.S.C. February 23, 2017).
- ⁴⁷ *Id.* at 11. 8.

⁴⁵ Whited Direct Testimony, ll. 599-603; Daniel Direct Testimony, ll. 377-85.

571 Commission that the rooftop solar market is in need of certainty and stability and that 572 the Commission should not wait for a general rate case to make a decision on the NEM 573 rate structure.

574

III. Net Metering Successor Program

575 Q. Please summarize the proposals by the DPU and OCS for a successor program to 576 NEM for customer generators.

A. Both the DPU and the OCS recommend that the Commission lower the cap on the NEM program and initiate the development of a new program for customer generators with a separate compensation rate for exported energy. They propose that the Commission initiate a new proceeding to develop a methodology or formula for calculating the compensation rate.⁴⁸

582 The DPU recommends that the Commission immediately lower the program 583 cap on the NEM program to reflect the approximate size the program will be on January 1, 2018, and close that program to new customers, and request that the legislature 584 585 eliminate the NEM program altogether January 1, 2025. DPU proposes a transition plan 586 for new customers with distributed generation after the NEM program closes until 587 January 1, 2025, after which all residential distributed generation customers would be 588 subject to whatever new rate structure(s) the Commission determines for consumption in this proceeding or a general rate case and separate compensation rates for exported 589 590 power. During the transition period and until the proceeding has been completed to 591 establish the compensation methodology and export rate, DPU recommends a 592 compensation rate for exported power that is the mid-point between the average retail

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⁴⁸ Powell Direct Testimony, ll. 454-582; Beck Direct Testimony, ll. 337-653.

593 rate for energy and the avoided cost rate. The DPU also recommends that the 594 Commission adopt at least two rate structures for the post-NEM program, one with 595 rates similar to the Company's proposed three-part rates and one TOU with on- and off-596 peak energy prices.

597 The OCS recommends that the Commission lower the NEM program cap to 598 approximately 10 percent. The OCS also proposes a transition plan pending a future 599 proceeding, but advocates extending the transition period for 12 years, until January 1, 600 2030. The compensation rate would start at 9 cents/kWh for new post-NEM distributed 601 generation customers, and decrease every year or two, transitioning into the new rate 602 that would be determined in the new proceeding to establish a compensation method 603 and rate. For rate design, the OCS recommends the Commission approve TOU rates 604 for residential and small commercial customers, to be calculated and implemented in 605 the next general rate case. OCS also recommends that a new facilities charge be 606 calculated in the next general rate case to apply to NEM program customers beginning 607 January 1, 2030.

608 Q. Do you agree with their recommendations to lower the cap on the NEM program?

A. Yes. The Company agrees that the most appropriate path forward is to lower the NEM
program cap and put in place a new program that separately considers the costs for
consumption from the grid and a rate for exported power. In light of the costs of the
NEM program, the Company recommends that the Commission initiate the transition
to a new program paradigm and adopt the DPU's recommendation to lower the NEM
program cap as of the estimated program size on January 1, 2018.

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615 616

Q. Please elaborate on why the Company supports the DPU's recommendation to lower the cap to the program size expected January 1, 2018.

The Company estimates that, by the end of 2017, the NEM program will have 617 A. 618 interconnected or have pending applications for installations that equate to nearly 5 619 percent of NEM program cap, which is 231 MW. At 231 MW, assuming residential 620 comprises 75 percent of installed capacity, the annual residential cost shift would be \$12.5 million. At a 10 percent threshold, as proposed by the OCS, the annual cost shift 621 would double to \$25.0 million. The Company estimates that the program will reach the 622 623 10 percent threshold, or 462 MW, during 2020 or early 2021. Waiting to take action 624 would not be in the public interest and would continue the incorrect market signals, over-value the power exported to the grid, and perpetuate the customer confusion that 625 626 currently exists. In addition to the DPU and OCS explicitly recognizing that the current 627 NEM program regime results in cost shifting, other parties—notably EFCA, UCE, 628 Vivint Solar, and Vote Solar-implicitly acknowledge that equating the export credit to 629 the retail rate is problematic and recommend that, if modification to the current program is necessary, changes should be made to the export compensation.⁴⁹ 630 631 Transitioning away from the current NEM program sooner would help provide a more 632 certain pathway for both customers and solar developers, while minimizing negative 633 impacts on other customers.

⁴⁹ See e.g., EFCA argues that adjusting the export rate may resolve the Company's concerns requiring a separate class. Gilfenbaum Direct Testimony, ll. 414-20. UCE recommends that, if a change in the NEM program is necessary, compensation for excess generation should be reduced. Whited Direct Testimony, ll. 559-63. Vivint proposes an alternative that would step down the value for exported energy. Plagemann Direct Testimony, ll. 281-3. Vote Solar proposes a declining compensation rate for net excess energy to address the Company's concerns about cost shifting. Gilliam Direct Testimony, ll. 760-3.

Q. Does the Company support establishing a new program with a separate
 compensation rate for exported power and a new proceeding to set the
 methodology for that compensation rate?

637 A. Yes. The Company supports the framework adopted by the Commission in Phase 1 of 638 this proceeding that uses the cost of service study to evaluate the NEM program 639 because NEM equates the value of customer generation to the retail rate. In other 640 words, the Company believes that, so long as retail rates are applied to NEM, the same 641 model used in setting retail rates is appropriate to assess the costs and benefits of NEM 642 and formulate an appropriate rate structure. However, if the export rate is separated out 643 from consumption, i.e., netting and banking are eliminated, the Company would 644 support a renewed look at how to set the rate to compensate exported power from 645 customer generators.

646 Q. If the Commission opened a new proceeding, what should the proceeding647 consider?

648 The proceeding should consider how or if the value of exported power is different than A. 649 the value already determined by the Commission for calculating avoided costs for small 650 power producers under Schedule 37. The Commission has already determined that the 651 customer generation equipment is not a system resource as the Company has little if 652 any control over the systems and the customer is under no obligation to maintain the system or supply the utility with electricity.⁵⁰ Moreover, customer generation exported 653 654 to the grid is incidental to the purpose of the installation, which is to support or self-655 supply the customer's own needs. Nevertheless, exported power is essentially a must-

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⁵⁰ Docket No. 14-035-114, Order, at Section 2.7 (Utah P.S.C November 10, 2015).

take obligation by the Company. Thus, the proceeding should consider the value of
exported power against this backdrop and the Commission's previous determinations
for the avoided cost rates for other power the Company is obligated to purchase. It
should also consider the frequency of updates to the compensation rate to stay current
with changes in the market or other changes in quantifiable costs and benefits.

661 Q. Do you agree with the DPU's proposal to establish a transitional compensation 662 rate that is the mid-point between the average retail rate and avoided costs?

663 No. This proposed transitional rate would be approximately 6.7 cents/kWh. This is far A. 664 in excess of the rates the Commission has already determined for the Company's purchases of electricity from third-party suppliers through avoided costs or through the 665 666 competitive wholesale market. The Commission is required to set just and reasonable 667 rates. Without evidence or data that there is additional value of this must-take 668 generation, the Commission should not arbitrarily set a new rate for energy or merely 669 split the difference. Accordingly, the Company proposes that the Commission use 670 approved Schedule 37 rates for a fixed solar facility, adjusted for losses at the primary 671 or secondary voltage levels, until a new proceeding is completed.

672 Q. How would the export compensation be treated on the customer's bill and through 673 ratemaking?

A. The Company's current meters separately register the electricity a customer takes from
the grid and the electricity the customer's generation exports to the grid. The Company
would multiply the measured exported power by the compensation rate set by the
Commission to calculate a monthly bill credit for the customer. The credit would be
applied against the customer's monthly energy and power charges on the bill. The bill

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679 credit would not be applied against any monthly fixed charges or minimum bills in 680 order to ensure recovery of non-by passable costs. In order to provide an economic 681 signal for the customer to properly size his or her facility (i.e., a system sized to serve 682 on-site needs), any dollar credits would carry over to the next monthly bill during an 683 annual program period, such as the end of March. At the end of the 12-month program 684 period, any excess bill credits would expire with the remaining balance donated to the 685 low income program, similar to the current treatment under the NEM program. Customer generation that is used to serve the customer's on-site usage (i.e., stays 686 687 behind the meter) would result in a reduction in usage from the utility and would 688 effectively receive the value of retail rates.

As noted by Dr. Powell, recovery of the exported power compensation would
 flow through the Energy Balancing Account, or other mechanism, as a purchased power
 expense on a situs Utah basis.⁵¹

692 Q. What is the Company's recommendation for rates for consumption under the new 693 program?

A. Even under a new program that eliminates netting and banking of exported power, a
new customer rate structure would be appropriate in order to capture the change in the
customer profile. Rate structures such as those proposed for Schedule 5 in this rebuttal
filing—a demand-based TOU and an energy-based TOU rate design—would be
appropriate for the reasons already addressed above.

⁵¹ Powell Direct Testimony, ll. 546-8.

699 Q. Please summarize why the Commission should move to adopting a new program
700 for customer generation that does not rely on kWh netting and banking of
701 exported power.

- 702 A. One of the most significant causes of cost shifting due to the NEM program is that it 703 conflates the retail rate with a value for exported energy. The retail rate, however, 704 recovers significantly more costs that are necessary for the provision of safe and 705 reliable energy from the utility than just the value of purchased energy. In order to 706 create more sustainable, economic price signals, the Company, along with the DPU and 707 OCS, proposes establishing a new program for private generation customers that 708 eliminates netting and banking and provides a compensation rate for exported energy 709 from private generation systems. The compensation rate should consider the value of 710 this must-take energy to the utility based on treatment consistent with how other power 711 purchases are valued. Separating the compensation rate for exported power from the 712 retail rate will also allow it to change as the market or other quantifiable values change.
- 713 Q. Does this conclude your rebuttal testimony?
- 714 A. Yes.